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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two chapters. Chapter one studies distortionary ef-
fects of tax exemption of employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) premiums.
First, I argue that, in the competitive labor market, tax deductibility of ESHI pre-
miums generates an implicit labor cost subsidy to the employers sponsoring health
insurance (HI) which distorts the allocation of labor across employers. Second, I quan-
tify the extent of this misallocation measured as output loss in a general equilibrium
model of firm dynamics extended to incorporate tax exemption of ESHI premiums
and endogenous provision of HI by the employers. The calibrated model shows that
elimination of tax exemption increases aggregate output by 1.73%. About two-thirds
of this effect comes from removing the misallocation of labor across existing estab-
lishments, and the remaining one-third comes from the increase in the number of
operating establishments. Third, I use the model to analyze how tax exemption in-
teracts with the employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act imposing a tax on
large employers not sponsoring HI. Quantitative results show that implementing the
employer mandate when the tax exemption is present reduces output by 0.13%.
Chapter two studies macroeconomic implications of a higher cost of health services
faced by the unemployed which arise because 1) workers lose access to ESHI when
they leave their jobs and 2) the uninsured face inflated health care prices. First, I
provide evidence suggesting that the cost of health services for the privately insured is
about 50% lower than for the uninsured. Second, I quantify the effects of higher cost
of health services for the unemployed in the Lucas and Prescott (1974) island model
extended to allow the workers to pay an extra cost of health services contingent on
their employment status. Calibration procedure uses the differences between costs of
health services for the privately insured and uninsured inferred from the data as a
gap between costs of health services for the employed and unemployed. Quantitative
i
results show that equalizing these costs across workers increases labor productivity by
1.2% and unemployment rate by 1.5 percentage points. The increased unemployment
dominates quantitatively leading to a decrease in aggregate output by 0.26%.
ii
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Chapter 1
DISTORTIONARY EFFECTS OF TAX EXEMPTION FOR
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS
1.1 Introduction
Under the current U.S. tax code, health insurance (HI) premiums are exempted
from determination of the workers’ income and payroll taxes 1 if workers obtain
HI through the employer. In contrast, if workers buy HI on their own through the
individual insurance market, HI premiums are paid from the after-tax income. In the
competitive labor market, this implies that the employers sponsoring HI face a lower
price of labor than those not doing it. Even though tax deductibitility of ESHI is
one of the largest tax breaks in the tax code 2 , not all employers take advantage of
it. For example, according to the Employer Health Benefits Survey (2015) conducted
by the Kaiser Family Foundation, only 57% of firms offered health benefits to their
employees in 2015. Such heterogeneity in HI provision coupled with the implicit
subsidy to the employers sponsoring HI leads to a misallocation of labor across firms
and a reduction of aggregate output. The objective of this paper is to quantify the
extent of this misallocation. More specifically, I ask what would be the effect of
eliminating the tax exemption of the ESHI premiums on the aggregate output.
To address this question, I extend a general equilibrium model of firm dynamics
as in Hopenhayn (1992) by incorporating the tax exemption of the premiums paid by
1These include federal and state income taxes, Social Security and Medicare taxes.
2Total federal tax revenue foregone because of the exclusion of the ESHI was $250 billion in 2013
which accounted for 1.5% of GDP (estimate is from Options for Reducing The Deficit: 2014 to 2023
(2013)).
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the employers and allowing the employer to choose whether or not sponsor HI. In the
model, provision of HI is associated with the following trade-off faced by the employer.
On the one hand, the employer must incur a fixed cost of setting up insurance plans,
bargaining with insurance companies, etc. On the other hand, provision of HI allows
the employer to lower the gross wage bill because ESHI premiums are deducted from
taxes. Put it differently, if the worker does not receive HI through the workplace and
instead buys it on the individual insurance market, his gross wage must be higher to
compensate for additional taxes paid on the HI premium. Thus, in the competitive
labor market, where the workers are indifferent between employers of different HI
provision status, the tax exemption of ESHI translates into an implicit subsidy to
the employers sponsoring HI 3 . Using the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Employer Health Insurance Survey data (Long and Marquis (1997)), I estimate that
such a subsidy is equivalent to a wage reduction of almost 10 percent. I then use
widely documented facts on establishment dynamics, as well as the data from the
aforementioned Survey to calibrate the model to match the key empirical patterns of
the establishment’s size distribution and HI provision among employers in the U.S. To
answer the main question of this paper, I completely eliminate the tax exemption of
the ESHI premiums within the calibrated model and find that the aggregate output
increases by 1.73%.
Two features of the equilibrium firm dynamics model are crucial for accurately
evaluating the distortionary effect of the tax exemption of the ESHI premiums: (i)
establishments’ heterogeneity; (ii) a life cycle of the establishments. The importance
3How much the gross wage can be lowered also depends on the utility that the worker attaches
to the HI obtained from different sources. To concentrate only on the distortionary effects of the
tax exemption of the ESHI premiums, I assume that the cost and the quality of HI do not depend
on whether it is provided by the employer or purchased individually. Typically, HI in the individual
insurance market would be more expensive which, as I argue in Section 1.4.2, further increases the
size of distortion.
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of these features is rooted in the empirical pattern of HI provision among employers.
In particular, I document that small employers are less likely to sponsor HI than the
large ones. For example, only about 34% of establishments with up to 5 employees
sponsor HI, while 98% of those with more than 100 employees do so. This positive
correlation between HI provision and the size implies that the tax exemption is, in
effect, a size-dependent policy reallocating labor resources across existing establish-
ments (intensive margin). Previous studies 4 analyzing size-dependent policies in
other contexts suggest that an impact of the policy on the output depends on the
extent of the correlation between introduced taxes/subsidies and the employer size.
Therefore, the ability of the model to capture HI provision across establishments of
different sizes is essential. At the same time, establishment’s life cycle in conjunction
with the described pattern has important implications for the number of establish-
ments in operation determined by the entry and exit (extensive margin). On the one
hand, because the large establishments are more likely to sponsor HI, the subsidy
increases profits of the large establishments relative to the small ones. On the other
hand, establishments enter the economy small and grow large over time. Because
of discounting, relatively larger profits received when the establishment grows large
vanish in the entrant’s expected life-time profit. As a result, the entrant’s value de-
creases relative to the average incumbent which discourages entry. Similar argument
applies to the small establishments experiencing bad shocks which implies that the
subsidy affects the incentives to exit. Quantitatively, I find that this channel plays
a substantial role: about one-third of 1.73% gain in the output is obtained on the
extensive margin through the changes in the entry and exit.
In this paper, I also study the effects of the employer mandate, a component of
the ongoing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) reform, when
4For example, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Guner et al. (2008), Hopenhayn (2012).
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the tax exemption of the ESHI premiums is in place. In practice, it introduces a
tax on the large employers not sponsoring HI. On its own, such tax is obviously dis-
tortionary because it imposes a wedge between labor costs faced by the employers.
But in interaction with the tax exemption of the ESHI premiums, the effects may
be non-trivial. On the one hand, since the tax applies to only the large employers,
it reallocates profits in the direction opposite to that induced by the tax exemption.
Specifically, it increases profits of the small establishments relative to the large ones
and can offset, at least partially, a negative effect of the tax exemption on the ex-
tensive margin. On the other hand, the tax increases the gap between the marginal
costs of labor faced by the large establishments sponsoring and not sponsoring HI.
This intensifies the extent of the misallocation across establishments within the same
productivity class and can enforce more distortion on the intensive margin. I quantify
these two forces in the calibrated model and find that the latter one dominates. As a
result, the aggregate output decreases by 0.13% compared to the economy featuring
the tax exemption only.
While this paper isolates an uncontroversial implication of the tax exemption of
the ESHI premiums resulting in the distortion on the output, caution must be taken
in interpreting the results. For the most part, because I analyze the distortion on the
production side of the economy, the focus is to model the establishment’s decisions
and to replicate a complex relationship between the employer size and HI provision
observed in the data. In contrast, the consumer’s side is kept very parsimonious
yet allowing me to realistically represent the U.S. economy. Because of that, many
benefits of ESHI to the individuals are not taken into account which prevents me from
drawing any welfare comparisons. For example, one could argue that by decreasing
the number of individuals receiving HI through the workplace, elimination of the ESHI
system reduces the welfare. Given this concern, my findings should be understood
4
that any alternative system able to cover the individuals covered under ESHI without
distorting the marginal costs of labor may result in the output increase by as much
as 1.73%. More meaningful welfare comparisons accounting for the changes in the
coverage would require to expand the consumer’s side in the model.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. On the health insurance
literature side, my paper relates to the group of papers studying implications of the tax
exemption of the ESHI premiums. For example, Jeske and Kitao (2009) focus on the
regressive nature of the ESHI effectively providing larger subsidies to the individuals
with higher income and the implications of that for the cost of the premiums, HI
coverage and welfare. Huang and Huffman (2014) examine how a combination of
the shifts in the consumption of medial services relative to other goods and changes
in the worker’s movements in and out of employment/unemployment due to the tax
exemption affects welfare. These papers concentrate exclusively on the implications
of the tax exemption of the ESHI premiums but they construct models which fully
abstract from the distribution of HI provision across employers of different sizes. Thus,
they also abstract from the key mechanisms evaluated in this paper. A contrasting
example is a paper by Brugemann and Manovskii (2009). They design a model with
endogenous choice of HI provision by the employers and directly address heterogeneity
in the employer’s HI provision and size. Though they incorporate tax deductibility
of the ESHI premiums as a component of the regulatory environment of the model,
the focus is on the effects of the ACA in the quantitative analysis. To sum up, my
contribution to this literature is that I draw the attention and quantitatively evaluate
the distortion created by the differential tax treatment of the HI premiums on the
production side of the economy which was previously overlooked in the literature.
Methodologically, the paper can be considered as a case study complementary
to the strand of the literature on the misallocation of resources across heterogeneous
5
firms. In these studies, regulations take many forms, from generic family of distortions
reflected in different taxes/subsidies faced by firms to more specific policies. In the
first case, the rationale for considering generic policies, as in Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008), Bhattacharya et al. (2013), Gabler and Poschke (2013), is often an observation
that smaller firms face lighter regulations as compared with large firms. These papers
usually examine a very wide range of the taxation schemes corresponding to different
extent of distortions and, hence, often find substantial negative effects on the aggre-
gate output. For example, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) calculate that taxing 50%
of the establishments at 40% reduces aggregate output by 31% (case of a correlated
distortion). In the second case, the studies concentrate on measuring distortions of
empirically-plausible policies. Among these studies are, for example, Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993) and Veracierto (2000), who study the policies making more costly for
the firms to adjust the employment level over time; Vereshchagina (2005), who stud-
ies the effects of targeted employment subsidy programs under which firms receive
subsidies for hiring disadvantaged workers; Buera et al. (2013), who study the effects
of the policy providing individual-specific subsidies to productive entrepreneurs that
remain fixed over time, and many others. These papers usually find milder disruptive
effects on the aggregate output. For example, Roys and Gourio (2013) evaluate that
eliminating the exemption of the small firms with less than 50 employees from the
regulations in France leads to an increase in the output by less than 0.3% when labor
supply and number of firms is fixed 5 . In this respect, my work finds a distortionary
effect which, quantitatively, is not an outlier. All in all, my contribution to this lit-
5An environment comparable to this paper to a larger extent includes inelastic labor supply and
elastic entry. Roys and Gourio (2013) find that elimination of the exemption of the small firms from
the regulation in this environment yields a steady-state output loss of 0.02%. The output loss from
removing a distortionary policy should not, however, come as a surprise because this result does not
account for the changes in the output along transition to the new steady state.
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erature is that I study the distortionary effects of the policy not directly comparable
to those studied in the mentioned papers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.4, a model with het-
erogeneous employers and endogenous HI provision is set up. Section 1.3 covers a
calibration procedure and explores quantitative results from contractual experiments.
The experiments cover elimination of the tax exemption of the ESHI premiums and
introduction of the ACA employer mandate in the presence of the subsidy generated
by the tax exemption. Section 1.4 provides the discussions omitted in the previous
sections which, however, are important remarks to the main findings. Section 2.6
concludes.
1.2 The Model
In this section, I describe a quantitative model based on Hopenhayn (1992) frame-
work. To characterize the responses of the economy to changes in the tax regulation
of the ESHI premiums, the model departs from Hopenhayn (1992) in letting estab-
lishments choose whether or not to sponsor HI for their employees. In equilibrium,
establishments sponsoring insurance benefit from an implicit labor cost subsidy that
generates a distortion to the allocation of labor resources across production units and
the number of operating establishment which I quantify in the next section.
The time is discrete in the model. There are two types of entities: establishments,
which produce the consumption good, and consumers, who supply labor services to
establishments. Two markets that operate in every period are the consumption good
and labor markets.
The main focus here is to study long run effects on aggregate output of alterna-
tive tax treatments of the ESHI premiums. Thus, I state the consumer’s and the
establishment’s problems in the environment with constant prices and define a sta-
7
tionary competitive equilibrium below. Consumption good is a numeraire with the
price normalized to one.
1.2.1 Establishments
Production side of the economy is represented by heterogeneous production units
or establishments.
Every period establishments experience idiosyncratic productivity shock, s ∈
[s, s¯] ⊂ R+. Shocks are independent across establishments and follow the same first-
order Markov process given by a function F (s′|s) where F (·|s) denotes the distribution
function for the next period’s shocks s′ for each value of the current period shock s.
Establishment of productivity s uses n units of labor to produce consumption good
in accordance with a production function f(s, n) which exhibits decreasing return to
scale in n:
f(s, n) = snθ, θ ∈ (0, 1).
Each establishment has to pay fixed cost of operation cf measured in the units
of output every period in which it produces. This cost is averted if establishment
exits the market. Establishments operating in the current period survive in the next
period with exogenous probability γ. Besides, all establishments surviving exogenous
exit may voluntarily leave the market before the next period’s information is revealed.
Endogenous and exogenous exit combined determine overall exit rate in the economy.
In every period, there is an unlimited mass of potential ex-ante identical entrants
which can enter the market after paying ce units of consumption good as an entry
cost. Once ce is paid, entrants independently draw their initial productivity from the
invariant distribution with the c.d.f. G(s), s ∈ [s, s¯].
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Labor market is competitive while establishments are distinguished by the struc-
ture of the compensation package they offer in exchange for labor services. Besides
paying wages, establishments may choose to sponsor HI for their employees purchased
in a group health insurance marketplace at a cost HG. I assume that insurance mar-
kets are not present in the model. Instead, establishments shop for HI in the market-
place at a fixed price, or HI premiums, HG measured in the units of the numeraire
good. Establishments cannot discriminate and select to cover only a portion of their
workers. Thus, the establishments are constrained to offer HI to all employed workers
in case of provision. Setting up a coverage for the establishment is associated with
a random fixed cost ch ∈ [ch, c¯h] ⊂ R+ to be paid in every period when the cov-
erage is offered. This cost represents a fixed cost of administering insurance plans,
bargaining with insurance companies, collecting premiums, billing, advertising, any
type of broker fees, etc 6 . It is measured in the units of output and wasted from the
standpoint of the economy. Cost ch is independent across establishments and follows
a Markov process with a transition function P (c′h|ch). Entrant’s initial value of ch is
drawn from the distribution function Q(ch). Wages of establishments of different pro-
vision statuses are denoted w0 and w1 where subscripts 0 and 1 are, correspondingly,
for establishments not sponsoring and sponsoring HI. The compensation package of
the establishment having decided not to sponsor HI consists of the wage w0 which
represents per employee gross wage and the marginal cost of labor for this establish-
ment. The compensation package of the establishment having decided to sponsor HI,
(w1, H
G), consists of the wage w1 and HI H
G. Thus, the marginal cost of labor for the
6For the employers operating their own health plan as opposed to purchasing a plan from an
insurance company, so called self-insured plan, ch cost may also include premiums for stop-loss
insurance which reimburses the employer for claims that exceed a predetermined level; any costs
billed by the third-party administrator or a carrier that processes insurance claims and other aspects
of the employee’s HI.
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establishment sponsoring HI is determined by the total cost of the package (w1, H
G).
Wages w0 and w1 are determined in equilibrium which is described later.
Events within a period unfold as follows. At the beginning of period t, 1 − γ
fraction of incumbents at each state leaves the market according to the exogenous
exit rate. Next, surviving incumbents decide to exit or stay (endogenous exit). If
establishment exits, it does not produce or pay fixed costs in subsequent periods. If
establishment chooses to stay, it draws a productivity shock s from F (s|s−1) and fixed
cost of HI provision ch from P (ch|ch−1). Then, decisions about current employment
n and HI provision χ are made, fixed costs cf and, if insurance is offered, ch are
paid, production takes place and final good is sold to the consumers. As for the
entrants, they are required to pay a one-time cost of entry ce before values of shocks
are revealed to them. Upon entry, the order of events in the first period is the same
as for the establishments having already decided to stay, i.e., entrants cannot exit in
the first period after they observe the shocks and produce at least one period. Also,
productivity and fixed cost of setting up the insurance for entrants are drawn from G
and Q, correspondingly. In subsequent periods, entrants join the pool of incumbents.
To formally state the establishment’s decision problem, one needs to recognize
that establishments in this economy are indexed by the productivity level s and fixed
cost of setting up the insurance ch. Note also that, whereas current values of s and ch
affect distributions of next periods shocks, employment and HI provision decisions do
not change future paths of shocks. Thus, optimal employment and provision decisions
of the establishment in the state (s, ch) are derived from the static profit maximization
problem which I specify below.
Instantaneous profit of the establishment in the state (s, ch) hiring n units of labor
are given by:
- if the establishment does not sponsor HI
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pi0(s, ch, n;w0, w1) = sn
θ − w0n− cf ;
- if the establishment sponsors HI
pi1(s, ch, n;w0, w1) = sn
θ − (w1 +HG)n− cf − ch.
As before, lower subscripts 0 and 1 are to distinguish establishments not sponsoring
and sponsoring HI.
Then, optimal employment and provision decisions of the establishment in the
state (s, ch) are derived as follows:
- employment of the establishment having decided to not sponsor or sponsor HI
is deduced from, correspondingly,
pi∗0(s, ch;w0, w1) = Max
n≥0
{pi0(s, ch, n;w0, w1)},
pi∗1(s, ch;w0, w1) = Max
n≥0
{pi1(s, ch, n;w0, w1)}
(1.1)
and given by
n0(s, ch;w0, w1) =
(
sθ
w0
) 1
1−θ
,
n1(s, ch;w0, w1) =
(
sθ
w1+HG
) 1
1−θ
;
- HI provision decision is derived from
pi∗(s, ch;w0, w1) = Max {pi∗0(s, ch;w0, w1), pi∗1(s, ch;w0, w1)}
and denoted by χ(s, ch;w0, w1): χ(s, ch;w0, w1) = 1 when HI is sponsored,
χ(s, ch;w0, w1) = 0 otherwise.
Incumbent who has already decided to stay in the current period and observed
shock realizations confronts the following dynamic problem:
V (s, ch;w0, w1) = pi
∗(s, ch;w0, w1) + βγMax{0, Es′|s[Ec′h|chV (s′, c′h;w0, w1)]} (1.2)
11
where β is the discount factor, Es′|s (·) and Ec′h|ch (·) denote conditional expectation
operators of argument functions over the range of s′ for given s and c′h for given
ch. Expression Es′|s[Ec′h|chV (s
′, c′h;w0, w1)] which is compared to the outside option
normalized to zero in the second term of (1.2) is a future discounted value of the
establishment in the state (s, ch) if it decides to stay. Formally,
Es′|s[Ec′h|chV (s
′, c′h;w0, w1)] =
s¯∫
s
c¯h∫
ch
V (s′, c′h;w0, w1)dF (s
′|s)dP (c′h|ch).
Optimal exiting decision of the establishment is denoted
x(s, ch;w0, w1) =
 1, if Es′|s[Ec
′
h|chV (s
′, c′h;w0, w1)] ≥ 0,
0, else
where x(s, ch;w0, w1) = 1 corresponds to a decision to stay, and x(s, ch;w0, w1) = 0 -
to exit.
Potential entrant decides about entry before the state is known. Thus, the en-
trant’s value net of entry costs is calculated as
Ve(w0, w1) =
s¯∫
s
c¯h∫
ch
V (s, ch;w0, w1)dG(s)dQ(ch)− ce. (1.3)
1.2.2 Consumers
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical infinitely lived consumers
of measure 1 with preferences defined over the streams of the consumption good. On
their own, consumers can access only individual HI marketplace offering coverage at
HI ≥ HG. Analogous to the establishment side, there is no market for individual HI
and consumers shop for it in the marketplace at fixed price HI measured in the units
of the numeraire good. Premiums collected in the group and individual marketplaces
are distributed back to the consumers as a part of the lump sum transfer from the
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government. Recall that HI can be purchased either privately or provided by the
employer at no additional cost to the consumer. I assume that, independent of the
source of provision, HI provides the same flow of health services mandatory for all
individuals. Then, if consumers are identical, there is no loss of generality in assuming
that consumers do not incur any utility from HI or health services. Say shortly, the
assumption is that HI is not directly valued by the consumers and is required to have
by everyone in this economy 7 .
In every period, all consumers are endowed with one unit of productive time, and
supply of labor services is restricted to be either zero or one. Clearly, all individuals
supply one unit of labor every period because they do not value leisure. Not only
the labor market is competitive, the consumers can costlessly reallocate between the
employers with different provision statuses and compensation structures. Then, in
a given period the consumer chooses consumption, ct, and the type of the employer
to work for, ψt ∈ {0, 1}, where ψt = 1 corresponds to the employer offering HI and
ψt = 0 otherwise. Consumer’s problem then is:
U = Max
{ct,ψt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
subject to the budget constraint in all t
ct =
 w0(1− τ)−H
I + Πt + Tt, if ψt = 0,
w1(1− τ)− τGHG + Πt + Tt, if ψt = 1
ct ≥ 0, ψt ∈ {0, 1}
7This assumption can be relaxed without affecting the findings of this paper. For example,
one can assume that the consumers derive utility from having HI with consumer’s tastes being
distributed in accordance with some distribution. Then, a fraction of the population will choose
not to have HI which will be characterized by a threshold of a taste parameter. For the remaining
population that demands HI, the compensation packages of two types of establishments (sponsoring
and not sponsoring HI) will need to satisfy the equilibrium condition (1.5) below to sustain both
types of establishments in equilibrium. The rest of the equilibrium, including the subsidy to the
establishments sponsoring HI (1.7), will remain the same. Given that the tax exemption would
generate the same subsidy to the establishments sponsoring HI and, thus, the same distortion on
the the production side, I keep the consumer side very simple.
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where τ is the labor income tax levied on wages, τG is a tax levied on the premiums
paid by employers (tax exemption of ESHI is the case when τG = 0), Πt is the
consumer’s share in the profit of all establishments, Tt it the lump sum transfer from
the government to ensure a balanced budget constraint in every period. I assume
that all consumers own equal share in the aggregate profits and face equal transfers
from the government. Thus, Πt and Tt also denote aggregate amounts.
Consumer’s problem stated in this form reduces to maximizing per period utility
by choosing employment at the establishment which ensures the highest disposable
income remaining after HI purchase:
U˜ = Max
ψ∈{0,1}
(1− ψ)[w0(1− τ)−HI ] + ψ[w1(1− τ)− τGHG]. (1.4)
1.2.3 Equilibrium
In this section, I define equilibrium in which both establishments sponsoring and
not sponsoring HI coexist.
Tax Exemption and Implicit Subsidy to Employers
Because consumers can costlessly move between the employers, equilibrium with two
kinds of establishments stipulates that compensation packages at establishments spon-
soring and not sponsoring HI provide the consumers with the same utility level.
Equating disposable incomes of consumers employed at the establishments of differ-
ent provision statuses in (1.4) delivers an equilibrium relationship between w0 and
w1:
w1 = w0 − 1
1− τ
(
HI − τGHG) , (1.5)
Using (1.5), the cost of labor for the establishments sponsoring HI is
w1 +H
G = w0 − 1
1− τ
(
HI −HG(1− τ + τG)) . (1.6)
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Note that for any τG < τ the second term in (1.6) is positive if HG ≤ HI . This
implies that employers sponsoring HI access implicit labor cost subsidy generated
jointly by the differences in the premiums in individual and group HI marketplaces
and tax exemption of the ESHI premiums. When HI = HG = H, difference in the
tax treatment of the premiums is the sole source of the subsidy. In the latter case,
if ESHI premiums are tax exempt (τG = 0), the employers’ per employee costs are
τ
1−τH lower under the employer-sponsored provision than it would be otherwise. For
exposition purposes, I denote the size of the subsidy h (note that h is independent of
any equilibrium objects):
h =
1
1− τ
(
HI −HG(1− τ + τG)) . (1.7)
Intuitively, the subsidization effect is attained because in the case of the individual
provision, consumers pay HI premium from their after-tax income. With employer-
sponsored provision, premium is paid by the employer from the employee’s before-
tax income. In the latter case, individuals receive full value of benefits embedded
in the HI and do not incur any tax on this part of their income. But then, the
compensation package under employer provision costs less than wages necessary to
provide consumers with the level of utility when HI coverage is absent.
In the remainder of the paper, I rely on the relationship in (1.6) which states
that establishments sponsoring HI access implicit per employee labor cost subsidy
h. Given (1.5) and (1.6), the set of prices to be determined in equilibrium reduces
to one wage rate, w0. Herewith, w1 is determined as in (1.5) which is equivalent to
w1 = w0 −HG − h 8 , and marginal cost of labor for the establishments sponsoring
HI is given by (1.6) which is equivalent to w1 + H
G = w0 − h. In the remainder of
8If tax exemption of the ESHI premiums is eliminated, then w1 = w0 −HG holds, i.e., workers
get a reduction in the wage by exactly the cost of HI born by the employer. Otherwise, employers
extract extra value from providing HI lowering wages by more than it costs to purchase HI as in
(1.6).
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the paper, I utilize (1.5) and (1.6) to replace w1 and w1 + H
G in the model, drop
the subscript on w0 and switch to condition equilibrium objects on a single wage w
denoting w0.
Definition of Equilibrium
Before I define equilibrium, there are several useful generalizations of the decisions to
exit and sponsor HI that simplify characterization of equilibrium objects and aggre-
gate variables.
First, for each s the decision to sponsor HI is characterized by a threshold c∗h(s)
such that
χ(s, ch;w) =
 1, if ch ≤ c
∗
h(s),
0, else.
The proof is obvious. Because for any positive subsidy pi∗1(s, 0;w) > pi
∗
0(s, 0;w) ∀s,
all establishments decide in favor of HI at ch = 0. At the same time, pi
∗
1(s, ch;w)
is strictly decreasing in ch for a fixed s implying that there exit c
∗
h(s) such that
pi∗0(s, c
∗
h(s);w) = pi
∗
1(s, c
∗
h(s);w), and pi
∗
1(s, ch;w) > pi
∗
0(s, 0;w) = pi
∗
0(s, ch;w) for all
ch ≤ c∗h(s), i.e., establishments sponsor HI for all ch ≤ c∗h(s). Reverse for all ch > c∗h(s).
Second, endogenous exit is summarized by the set of thresholds of productivity
s∗(ch) ∀ch increasing in ch. In words, the first time the establishment’s state is (s, ch),
where s < s∗(ch), establishment optimally exits the market.
Now, I characterize some equilibrium objects, define equilibrium and formalize
several aggregate variables for future discussion. Transition functions F and P , dis-
tribution functions G and Q, exogenous probability of survival γ, endogenous exit
decisions of the establishments and mass of entry induce a distribution of establish-
ments over the individual states in every period. Denote µ(S,Ch) to be the density
function of the distribution of establishments over individual states at the end of the
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period t− 1 (S and Ch are from the Borel sets of the support of distribution of s and
ch, correspondingly). Let M be the mass of establishments entering at the beginning
of period t. Then, the aggregate state of the economy at the end of period t after exit
of incumbents has occurred, new establishments have entered and all information has
been revealed is given by:
µ′([s, s′), [ch, c
′
h)) = γ
∫
s˜∈[s,s′)
∫
c˜h∈[ch,c′h)
∫
ch∈[ch,c¯h]
∫
s≥s∗(ch)
dF (s˜|s)dP (c˜h|ch)dµ(s, ch) +
+M
∫
s˜∈[s,s′)
∫
c˜h∈[ch,c′h)
dQ(c˜h)dG(s˜).
(1.8)
First term in (1.8) accounts for the transition of incumbents across the states ac-
knowledging exogenous and endogenous exit. Second term takes into consideration
the distribution of state variables across entrants.
At the end of period t, the mass of establishments sponsoring HI in S, µ′1(S), is
µ′1([s, s
′)) =
∫
s˜∈[s,s′)
∫
ch≤c∗h(s˜)
dµ′(s˜, ch).
Definition of Equilibrium. Given (1.5) and (1.6), a stationary recursive com-
petitive equilibrium with two types of establishments and entry consists of the wage
rate w∗ denoting equilibrium value of w0, employment decisions of the consumers
ψ∗i (w
∗) ∀i ∈ [0, 1] where i denotes consumer’s index, value functions for the incumbent
establishment V (s, ch;w
∗) and the entrant Ve(w∗), establishment’s optimal employ-
ment decisions n(s, ch;w
∗), exiting decisions x(s, ch;w∗) and HI provision decisions
χ(s, ch;w
∗), the sets of thresholds c∗h(s) ∀s and s∗(ch) ∀ch, mass of entry M∗ > 0 and
the distribution of establishments µ such that:
1. Given w∗, employment decisions ψ∗i (w
∗) solve consumer’s optimization problem
(1.4) ∀i ∈ [0, 1];
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2. Given w∗, value function V (s, ch;w∗) is a solution to the establishment’s problem
(1.2); n(s, ch;w
∗), x(s, ch;w∗) and χ(s, ch;w∗) are the corresponding optimal
decision rules;
3. Free entry condition is satisfied
Ve(w
∗) = 0
where Ve(w) is defined as in (1.3);
4. Labor market clears:
Nd0 (w
∗) = N s0 (w
∗), Nd1 (w
∗) = N s1 (w
∗)
where N s0 (w)/N
s
1 (w) and N
d
0 (w)/N
d
1 (w) denote aggregate labor supply and de-
mand (upper script is to denote supply or demand, lower script - the type of
the establishment) calculated as:
Nd0 (w) =
s¯∫
s
c¯h∫
c∗h(s)
n(s, ch;w)dµ(s, ch), N
d
1 (w) =
s¯∫
s
c∗h(s)∫
ch
n(s, ch;w)dµ(s, ch),
N s0 (w) =
∫
(1− ψ∗i (w∗))di, N s1 (w) =
∫
ψ∗i (w
∗)di.
Values of c∗h(s) ∀s are consistent with optimal provision decisions χ(s, ch;w∗);
5. Stationary distribution of establishments over individual states, µ, evolves in ac-
cordance with (1.8) given the constant mass of entry M∗ and threshold produc-
tivities s∗(ch) ∀ch. Values of s∗(ch) are consistent with optimal exiting decisions
of establishments x(s, ch;w
∗);
6. The government budget constraint is satisfied:
T =
(
τw∗ +HI
)
N s0 (w
∗) +
(
τw1(w
∗) + τHIHG +HG
)
N s1 (w
∗).
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where w1(w
∗) denotes equilibrium level of w1 determined as w1(w∗) = w∗ −
HG − h.
Standard algorithm can be used to compute the equilibrium in this economy. Be-
cause wage is the only equilibrium object that affects the establishment’s value, the
equilibrium wage w∗ is pinned down by the free entry condition. Given w∗, equilib-
rium distribution of establishments can be found for any arbitrary mass of entry. Let
µˆ(s, ch) be the stationary distribution of establishments generated by a unit mass of
entry. As in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), µ(s, ch) = Mµˆ(s, ch) holds here. There-
fore, given optimal employment decisions n(s, ch;w
∗) and µˆ(s, ch), equilibrium mass
of entry M∗ is pinned down by the labor market clearing condition. Note that, in the
equilibrium, the consumers are indifferent between the employers. Thus, the alter-
native formulation of the labor market clearing condition would equate overall labor
demand Nd(w∗) = Nd0 (w
∗) +Nd1 (w
∗) and supply N s(w∗) = N s0 (w
∗) +N s1 (w
∗) = 1:
s¯∫
s
c¯h∫
ch
n(s, ch;w
∗)dµ(s, ch) = 1.
Several aggregate variables of interest can be found as:
- gross aggregate output Y (does not account for any fixed costs):
Y =
s¯∫
s
c¯h∫
ch
f(n(s, ch;w), s)dµ(s, ch),
- aggregate output Y˜ (accounts for all kinds of fixed cost: cf , ch and ce):
Y˜ = Y −
s¯∫
s
c¯h∫
ch
cfdµ(s, ch)−
s¯∫
s
c∗h(s)∫
ch
chdµ(s, ch)−Mce,
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- total subsidy to the establishments sponsoring HI S:
S = h
s¯∫
s
c∗h(s)∫
ch
n(s, ch;w)dµ(s, ch),
- one period aggregate profit of all operating establishments Π:
Π =
s¯∫
s
c¯h∫
ch
pi∗(s, ch;w)dµ(s, ch)−M∗ce = Y˜ − wNd(w) + S,
- lump-sum transfer to consumers T :
T = τwN s(w) +HIN s(w)− S,
- aggregate consumption C:
C = w(1− τ)N s(w)−HIN s(w) + Π + T.
Since in the equilibrium Nd(w) = N s(w) = 1, it also follows that C = Y˜ .
1.3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I quantify the distortionary effects of the subsidy generated by the
tax exemption of ESHI premiums.
The exposition is split into several parts. First, I discuss the calibration procedure
for the benchmark of the quantitative model and compare the calibrated benchmark
to the data. Second, I perform numerical experiments of setting the subsidy to
zero to evaluate output gains from eliminating the tax exemption under a fixed and
endogenously determined distribution of establishments. Last, I evaluate and discuss
the response of the economy to the regulation resembling most important features of
the employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act in the presence of the tax exemption
of ESHI premiums, i.e., in the presence of the subsidy.
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1.3.1 Calibration
Calibration procedure is carried out so that the model mimics some features of
the U.S. data on the establishment dynamics and ESHI. A large part of the calibra-
tion procedure follows the strategy in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) but differs
in postulating that the establishments sponsoring HI are granted access to the labor
cost subsidy h.
To calibrate the model, I have to choose 16 parameters, as summarized in Table 2.1
below. The length of the model period corresponds to 1 year in the data so as standard
in the literature. I assign the discount factor β is set to 0.96 which corresponds to
the annual interest rate of 4%. The parameter of the decreasing return to scale θ
in the establishment level production function is assigned 0.85 which has been used
in the related papers, for example, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Brugemann
and Manovskii (2009). Also standard, I normalize w = w0 = 1 in the benchmark
and calibrate the cost of entry ce so that the free entry condition holds under this
normalization.
Next, I assign a value to the labor cost subsidy h in (1.7) imputing it from the data
without solving the model. To approximate its’ magnitude, I assume HI = HG = H
and τG = 0, and measure the subsidy h = τ
1−τH. Such estimate essentially provides
a lower bound for h which I use for the benchmark 9 . In the next section, the
numerical experiment of removing the subsidy is repeated for different values of h
while the model is recalibrated for every given level of the subsidy.
To construct h from the data, I need to know employer’s payments towards HI
deducted from the determination of individual’s taxable income, H, and tax rates at
which these payments are exempt, τ . Since I adopt normalization w = w0 = 1, nor-
9More stringent empirical estimate of h would distinguish between HI and HG and take into
account the generosity of plans purchased individually and by the employers.
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malizing the measure of H by an average per employee payroll of establishments not
sponsoring HI in the data will harmonize H with w = 1 in the model. I assign H a
value of an average per employee HI premium payments of establishments sponsoring
HI equal to $3,130.8 or 14.93% of the average per employee payroll of establishments
not sponsoring HI in 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health In-
surance Survey, Long and Marquis (1997) 10 (in the reminder of the paper, I refer
to this data source as the Survey). To determine the subsidy, I apply the effective
marginal tax rate τ = 0.4 consistent with Prescott (2004). The labor cost subsidy h
then is calculated to be $2,087.2 or 0.0995 after normalization.
The remaining parameters are calibrated jointly by solving numerically for the
equilibrium of the model for different sets of parameters and choosing one set at which
the equilibrium statistics are closer to the targets. Table 2.1 lists the targets next to
the parameters adjusting which the match is achieved. Table 2.2 provides the values
of the targets in the data and corresponding benchmark statistics from the calibration
exercise to illustrate the match of the model to the data. The proceeding discussion
in this section elaborates on the choice of parameters and details of constructing the
targets from the data.
Transition functions F (s′|s) and P (c′h|ch) are calibrated taking approximations of
the AR(1) processes of ln(st) and ln(cht) on the discrete grids for s and ch with 100
grid points each:
ln(st) = as + ρs ln(st−1) + t,
ln(cht) = ach + ρch ln(cht−1) + ξt,
10The Survey contains information on the characteristics of employers and their offers of HI
coverage (the plan types, premiums, benefits, cost-sharing, etc.). The data work carried out using
the Survey is based on the sample of 21,545 private sector establishments weighted by the sampling
weights provided in the Survey.
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where
t ∼ N(0, σ2s), as ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ρs < 1,
ξt ∼ N(0, σ2ch), 0 ≤ ρch < 1.
The functions F and P are computed using Tauchen’s discretization method (Tauchen
(1986)).
Picking parameters for these processes requires some deliberation. First, observe
that the establishment’s dynamics in the model is driven by stochastic processes of
both productivity s and fixed cost of setting up HI ch. The latter determines HI
provision decisions of establishments and, therefore, their access to the subsidy which
affects the employment. Because changes in the establishment’s employment over
time are driven by changes in both s and ch, a straightforward link between parameters
of the ln(st) process and the law of motion for ln(nt) cannot be established to calibrate
ρs and σs as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). Thus, I take the following strategy.
Even though the establishments granted access to the subsidy adjust their em-
ployment, productivity remains a predominant driving force of changes in the estab-
lishment’s employment over time. Hence, I pick ρs so that the estimated regression
coefficient ρˆ of the AR(1) process of log employment
ln(nt) = a+ ρ ln(nt−1) + ηt, (1.9)
in the equilibrium of the model matches comparable estimate of the same process
in the data. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Lee and Mukoyama (2008) report
estimates of the AR(1) process of plant-level log employment derived from the samples
of manufacturing establishments. For calibration, I obtain alternative estimates of
(1.9) utilizing information on establishments irrespective of their industry. Along with
the question about the total number of active employees which identifies nt, the Survey
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asks two questions allowing to approximate the number of employees in the previous
year, nt−1. It includes questions about a number of permanent employees added, ∆n+t ,
and removed, ∆n−t , from the payroll in the last 12 months. Using this information,
I construct a variable nt−1 = nt − ∆n+t + ∆n−t to find the number of employees in
t− 1 and estimate regression (1.9) restricting dataset to the establishments aged one
year and older. Estimation procedure yields the regression coefficient of the process
ρˆ = 0.9574 11 .
When choosing σs, I target to match the fraction of establishments in the smallest
size category from 1 to 5 employees. Recall that changing over time ch and access
to the subsidy push establishments to decide differently about employment even in
the absence of changes in productivity. This variation contributes to the variance in
the establishment’s growth rates over time and lowers σs necessary to match it in
the data. The life-time growth of establishments slowers down if σs is low leading to
the size distribution with a large share of small establishments. Meanwhile, model’s
predictions regarding the distortion might be significantly affected by the ability of
the model to replicate the distributions of establishments and HI. Thus, I target
a statistics related to the establishment’s size distribution rather than often used
variance of the growth rates of n.
The value of as, the constant of the process of log productivity, determines the
mean of the process and is set to match the average employment level in the data.
Second, my strategy to pick the parameter values for the process of ln(cht) is to
target the patterns of HI provision of establishments in the U.S. I choose a persistence,
11In the Survey, the number of active employees, nt, refers to all types of employees including
temporary and seasonal workers. At the same time, questions about ∆n+t and ∆n
−
t are related to
the permanent employees only. It is possible to estimate the regression (1.9) using the number of
permanent employees because establishments report fractions of temporary and seasonal workers
which can be used to eliminate them from nt. The estimate of ρ from such regression are very
similar to the one reported above.
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ρch , so that the slope coefficients from the same regression of current period the
establishment’s HI provision dummy on the dummy for HI two years earlier coincide
in the equilibrium of the model and the data:
dt = ad + ρddt−2 + ζt
where dt and dt−2 are the dummy variables equal 1 if HI is sponsored and 0 otherwise
in periods t and t−2. Such seemingly unusual choice is dictated by the availability of
the information on the dynamics of HI provision of establishments in the Survey used
to estimate this regression. As with the employment, the Survey asks two questions
about the establishment’s dynamics of HI provision status over time. Establishments
not sponsoring HI at the time of the Survey are asked whether they offered HI within
two years prior to the Survey date. In contrast, establishments sponsoring HI are
asked about number of years HI has been offered. The clear drawback of the for-
mulation of the first question is that it does not refer to a particular point in time.
Similarly, the second question lacks a clear identification whether HI has been contin-
uously offered during the period indicated by the establishment. Hence, any statistics
on the dynamics of HI provision derived from these questions may not take into ac-
count all variation over time. For calibration purposes, I treat these questions as if the
establishments were asked either about provision exactly two years ago or about the
time they continuously offered HI. Then, limiting the dataset to the establishments
of 2 years and older, I construct the dummy variables dt and dt−2 and estimate the
slope of the regression ρˆd = 0.8086.
The remaining parameters of the ln(cht) process, ach and σch , are tied to the dis-
tribution of HI provision across establishments. Specifically, I choose them to match
the fraction of establishments providing HI in the first size category of establishments
from 1 to 5 employees and overall fraction of establishments sponsoring HI.
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For the distribution of the shocks at entry, I assume that both s and ch have log
normal distributions: s ∼ lnN (µents , σents ) and ch ∼ lnN (µentch , σentch ). Parameters µents
and µentch are chosen to correspondingly match the share of entrants in the first size
category from 1 to 5 employees and the fraction of those providing HI. The values
of σents and σ
ent
ch
are set to match the model predictions about the average size of
entrants and the overall rate of HI provision among them with the data. The data for
calculating the targets for entrants were limited to the establishments aged 1 year and
younger (I refer to these establishments as young in the remainder of the calibration
section).
Values of cf and γ are chosen so that entrant’s and overall exit rates in the model
match correspondingly the 1 year exit rate of young establishments and overall exit
rate observed in the data.
As mentioned, parameters and their calibrated values, and targets in the data
are summarized in Table 2.1. Table 2.2 displays the calibration targets and model
statistics next to them. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 report distributional statistics of the U.S.
economy and corresponding benchmark values.
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Parameter Target Value
Subsidy, h Equated to Hτ
1−τ at τ = 0.4 and 0.0995
H = av. HI spendings normalized by
av. payroll of est. not sponsoring HI 12
Discount factor, β Interest rate 0.96
Decreasing return to scale, θ Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) 0.85
Constant of the ln(st) process, as Av. establishment size
13 0.0148
AR(1) coefficient of the ln(st) process, ρs AR(1) coefficient of the ln(nt) process 0.9632
SD of the ln(st) process, σs Establishment share, < 5 employees
14 0.0613
Constant of the ln(cht) process, ach Fraction of establishments sponsoring HI, < 5 -0.3865
AR(1) coefficient of the ln(cht) process, ρch Slope coefficient from the regression 0.9532
of HI provision dummy on the dummy
for HI two years earlier
SD of the ln(cht) process, σch Fraction of est. sponsoring HI
15 1.1
Mean of G distribution of s for entrants, µents
16 Share of young establishments, < 5 0.2547
SD of G distribution of s for entrants, σents Av. size of young establishments 0.2296
Mean of Q distribution of ch for entrants, µ
ent
ch
Fraction of young est. sponsoring HI, < 5 4.2469
SD of Q distribution of ch for entrants, σ
ent
ch
Fraction of young est. sponsoring HI 7.1484
Survival probability, γ 1 year exit rate 0.9265
Fixed cost of operation, cf 1 year exit rate of young establishments 0.4883
Entry cost, ce Entrant’s value at w = 1 13.088
Table 1.1: Benchmark Parameters
12Source: value of H and targets for ρs, ach , ρch , µ
ent
s , µ
ent
ch
and σentch are obtained from the
Survey, Long and Marquis (1997).
13Source: targets for as, σ
ent
s , γ and cf are calculated from Business Employment Dynamics
(BED) data for year 2000: http://www.bls.gov/bdm/us_age_naics_00_table5.txt;
http://www.bls.gov/bdm/us_age_naics_00_table6.txt.
14Source: Choi and Spletzer (2012), private sector establishment data for year 2000 from Table
1.
15Source: imputed using the size distribution of establishments from Choi and Spletzer (2012)
and the distribution of HI from the Survey, Long and Marquis (1997).
16Parameter values in this and next three rows are on the logarithmic scale.
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Variable Data Model
Average establishment size 17.14 17.14
Average size of young establishments 7.94 7.94
1 year exit rate, overall 9.46% 9.59%
1 year exit rate of young establishments 21.6% 21.61%
AR(1) coefficient of ln(nt) process 0.9574 0.9581
Slope coefficient from the regression of HI provision 0.8086 0.8032
dummy on the dummy for HI two years earlier
Establishment share, < 5 employees 0.498 0.4982
Share of young establishments, < 5 employees 0.7026 0.7024
Fraction of establishments sponsoring HI, < 5 employees 0.338 0.3348
Fraction of young establishments sponsoring HI, < 5 employees 0.1515 0.1510
Fraction of establishments sponsoring HI 0.5159 0.5182
Fraction of young establishments sponsoring HI 0.2233 0.2233
Table 1.2: Calibration Targets and Model Values
Establishment Size
< 5 5 to 9 10 to 19 20 to 49 50 to 99 ≥ 100
Share of establishments, data 17 0.498 0.209 0.137 0.095 0.033 0.027
Share of establishments, model 0.4982 0.1749 0.1320 0.1242 0.0406 0.0302
Fraction of est. sponsoring HI, data 18 0.338 0.567 0.689 0.820 0.916 0.982
Fraction of est. sponsoring HI, model 0.3348 0.5470 0.7005 0.8004 0.8805 0.9344
Table 1.3: Distributional Statistics, Overall
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Establishment Size
< 5 5 to 9 10 to 19 20 to 49 ≥ 50
Share of young establishments, data18 0.7026 0.165 0.0864 0.0341 0.0119
Share of young establishments, model 0.7024 0.1328 0.0793 0.0603 0.0252
Fraction of young est. sponsoring HI, data18 0.1515 0.3332 0.4333 0.4095 0.8741
Fraction of young est. sponsoring HI, model 0.1510 0.2819 0.4056 0.5071 0.6622
Table 1.4: Distributional Statistics, Entrants
Highlighted in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 are the shares of establishments in the first size
category and the fraction of those sponsoring HI. These statistics are directly targeted
and matching them does not come as a surprise. Less expected is that stochastic
processes for s and ch in tandem with the calibrated values of other parameters deliver
a reasonably good fit of the size distribution of establishments and the distribution
of HI which are not targeted. Overall, the model shows a good match to the data.
1.3.2 Results
In this section, I quantify the distortionary effects of the preferential tax treatment
of the ESHI premiums. Specifically, I evaluate the output gains from setting the
subsidy for the establishments sponsoring HI at h = 0. This hypothetical experiment
is intended to represent a regulation eliminating the tax exemption of the ESHI
premiums, or imposing τG = τ on HG in model terms, which wipes out tax benefits
for the establishments sponsoring HI 19 . I find that the aggregate output increases
by 1.73% (see the second column of Table 1.5).
17Source: Choi and Spletzer (2012), private sector establishment data for year 2000 from Table
1.
18Source: calculated using the Survey data, Long and Marquis (1997).
19More generally, the regulation imposes the same tax on HI and HG.
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Tax exemption of the ESHI premiums has two key implications in the economy
of this paper. One of them is a heterogeneity in the marginal costs of labor faced
by already existing production units arising because only a fraction of establishments
sponsoring HI is granted the access to the labor cost subsidy h (intensive margin).
This wedge between the labor costs faced by the establishments of different HI pro-
vision statuses leads to the misallocation of production factors across operating es-
tablishments and lowers the output produced by them. Another implication suggests
that distortions can be induced on the entry and exit of establishments (extensive
margin). Because the large establishments receiving the subsidy tend to be old, the
subsidy effectively redistributes resources from the young to the old establishments.
Thus, removing the subsidy is likely to affect the present value of the life-time profits
and impact the entry. Additionally, the stay/exit decisions of incumbents might be
affected by a combination of the subsidy and general equilibrium effects on wages.
By changing the number of establishments in operation, these distortions to the entry
and exit can amplify or weaken the output losses associated with the misallocation
of labor across already existing establishments.
I center the discussion of the quantitative results around these two implications
and decompose the effects of the subsidy removal along the intensive and extensive
margins. To understand the importance of the misallocation of labor across existing
establishments, I set h = 0 and find an off-the-equilibrium allocation assuming that
entry and exit decisions are fixed at their distorted levels in the benchmark. In this
allocation, the wage rate clears the labor market while the free entry condition is not
imposed. This exercise removes heterogeneity in the marginal costs of labor across
establishments and efficiently allocates labor across existing establishments which
allows me to evaluate the output gains from the reversal of the misallocation among
the mass of existing establishments on the intensive margin. Numerically, I find that
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the output net of all fixed costs increases by 1.11% compared to the benchmark (as
reported in the first row of third column in Table 1.5).
To characterize the effects of the subsidy on the entry and exit and evaluate the
importance of the extensive margin, I compute the full equilibrium model with h = 0.
In contrast to the previous analysis, all margins are in action here and, thus, compar-
ing the two economies’ responses regarding the aggregate output can illustrate the
importance of endogenizing the distribution of establishments. As mentioned, the
results for the full model indicate that the output accounting for all fixed costs to be
paid by the establishments increases by 1.73% upon the removal of the subsidy (the
second column in Table 1.5). The effect roots in the increased number of operating
establishments achieved through the changes in the exit and entry. Here, the increase
in number of entrants arises because the profits are redistributed from old to young
establishments upon the removal of the subsidy which increases the value of entry
above its’ value in the benchmark and encourages entry. The incentives to exit end
up being enhanced on average mainly because removing the subsidy increases the cost
of labor for the establishments sponsoring HI which drives up the exit among them.
Overall, despite that the elimination of the subsidy is accompanied by the increase
in the exit, the increased entry dominates and evolves into a larger mass of estab-
lishments. Thus, a large part of the output gain is obtained on the extensive margin
due to the changes in the entry and exit (1.73% vs. 1.11% when the distribution of
establishments is fixed).
Table 1.5 provides more details on these results:
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Variable Equilibrium Fixed number
effects of establishments
Output,Y˜ 1.0173 1.0111
Y˜ − cminh 1.0173 1.0111
Y˜ − ctotalh 1.0123 1.0061
Y˜ − cavh 1.0112 1.0050
Entry, M 1.1121 1
Exit 1.0104 1
Mass of establishments 1.1006 1
Table 1.5: Effects of Eliminating the Subsidy (Relative to Benchmark)
Along with the aggregate output Y˜ accounting for the fixed costs of setting up the
insurance as prescribed by the equilibria with fixed and endogenous number of es-
tablishments, Table 1.5 also reports three additional measures in lines 2-4 which
diverge from the definition of Y˜ in a way they regard ch. Observe that the output Y˜
demonstrates the extreme response of the economy when, having no other incentives
to sponsor HI at h = 0, all establishments drop provision and no fixed costs ch is
wasted. In this case, economizing on the fixed costs of HI provision may already
be a source of a significant increase in the output. Nevertheless, in a more realistic
scenario, fixed costs ch are likely to be shifted to another payer (at full or partially)
who will take upon the role of sponsoring HI for the population covered under ESHI.
Statistics reported in rows 2-4 explore some scenarios where the government institu-
tion covers the entire population in the government-sponsored universal health care
program and bears the costs of setting up HI previously borne by private companies
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(these statistics are reported relative to the benchmark output Y˜ ) 20 . In the ab-
sence of the direct evidence on the government’s efficiency in this kind of programs,
I look at three following cases. First, statistics Y˜ − cminh illustrates the case when
the government is very efficient at providing insurance and covers everyone at cminh
corresponding to the minimal establishment level per covered employee fixed cost of
HI provision. Essentially, this scenario does not affect the output gains compared to
no ch paid in Y˜ since per employee fixed ch costs for the establishment facilitating HI
provision in the most efficient way are negligible. Second measure, Y˜ −ctotalh , evaluates
the scenario in which the government is less efficient in implementing HI provision
for the population and incurs the same cost as private companies did to cover their
employees before. In this case, the output gains reduce to milder 1.23% and 0.61%.
Third measure, Y˜ − cavh , evaluates the least optimistic scenario when the government
is as efficient in getting access to HI as the establishments are in the benchmark model
and covers everyone at the benchmark average per covered employee fixed costs, cavh .
Here, the output gains drop to 1.12% and 0.5% but, notably, are still positive. To
sum up, these results demonstrate that even if the government cannot achieve the
reduction in ch compared to the private sector, either because ch is unavoidable in
nature or because it covers more individuals than are covered under ESHI, the output
still increases when the tax exemption is eliminated.
1.3.3 ACA Employer Mandate
The most recent health care reform, the ACA, institutes many HI programs.
Nevertheless, it does not alter the tax treatment of the premiums and, at the same
20Formally, cminh is the minimal establishment level ratio of fixed costs of setting up HI ch to
the number of employees in the benchmark; ctotalh is the sum of fixed costs of setting up HI borne
by all establishments sponsoring HI in the benchmark; cavh is the ratio of the total fixed costs of
HI provision borne by all establishments sponsoring HI to the total number of employees at these
establishments.
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time, introduces the employer mandate which might influence the effects produced by
the tax exemption. In effect, the mandate levies taxes on large firms not sponsoring
HI. By its very nature, such component is a distortionary policy because it affects
asymmetrically businesses of different sizes. However, various effects of the ACA
tax may mitigate or amplify the output losses caused by the subsidy which makes
it interesting to consider the ACA in the scope of this paper. On the one hand,
a tax levied on the large employers reallocates profits from the large to the small
establishments, in the direction opposite to that induced by the subsidy. Thus, the
ACA could encourage entry and, at least partially, offset the losses in the output
due to decreased entry. On the other hand, such reallocation happens mostly at the
expense of large establishments being a part of large firms not sponsoring HI. Thereby,
the ACA tax increases the gap between the marginal costs of labor faced by the large
establishments and entails more misallocation. This could undo the improvements in
the output through the number of establishments on the extensive margin. The net
effect of these two forces is a quantitative question which I explore by accommodating
the model of this paper to include a simplified version of the employer mandate.
ACA Description and Model Adjustments
In practice, a component of the ACA known as the employer mandate introduces
employer shared responsibility payment for large employers. This is a per year per full-
time employee (FTE) fee of $2,000 for employers with 50 or more FTEs if insurance
is not offered by the employer and at least one of employees receives a premium tax
credit in an Exchange 21 (the first 30 FTE are exempt). Additionally, if at least one
FTE receives a premium tax credit because coverage is either unaffordable or does
21Exchange refers to the Health Insurance Exchange Marketplace defined as individual insurance
market where insurance plans cannot price or deny coverage based on preexisting conditions.
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not cover 60% of total health care expenditures for typical population, the employer
must pay the lesser of $3,000 for each of those employees receiving a credit or $2,000
for each FTE minus 30 22 .
The model of this paper encompasses two forms of observed heterogeneity of
establishments essential for the employer mandate: size and HI provision. However,
the detailed specification of the mandate is not implementable in this environment
because in real world the penalty is conditioned on the size of business in terms of
FTE and premium tax credits received by employees in an Exchange. I take a simpler
stand and implement ACA-like regulation with the following assumptions. The ACA
tax τˆ is applied at the establishment level if HI is not sponsored and the size of the
establishment passes a threshold ntr = 50 employees with first nex = 30 workers
exempt. Regulation modified in this way imposes a wedge between the costs of labor
for large establishments, similar to the ACA, but is implemented at the establishment
rather than firm level 23 and waives all conditions for applying the penalty beyond
size measured in the number of employees and HI provision.
In the model, such regulation requires to only adjust a static profit maximization
problem of an establishment having decided to not sponsor HI given by (1.1). The
problem now assumes a choice between staying below the threshold ntr and avoiding
tax, and passing ntr and paying the tax. As so, the instantaneous profit of the
22More details on the employer shared responsibility payments is available at http://
obamacarefacts.com/obamacare-employer-mandate.php.
23Because some small establishments with < 50 employees may be a part of a large firm taxed
by the ACA, restricting the employer mandate to establishments with ≥ 50 employees is an obvious
limitation (note that establishments with ≥ 50 employees do not create any tension with the sim-
plified policy; for such establishments the regulation applies independent of whether they operate
as a part of a multi-establishment firm or as a single-unit establishment). However, the Survey
reveals that an extent of this happening might be small in the data. Specifically, only 16.44% of
establishments with < 50 employees count as establishments in multi-establishment firms with ≥ 50
employees. The fraction of those to which the ACA tax might be applied is even smaller since the
majority of large firms sponsor HI. Hence, implementation of the ACA at the firm level in the model
might not be a channel that substantially changes the predictions of the simplified ACA regulation
considered here.
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establishment having decided not to sponsor HI can be written as:
pi∗0(s, ch;w) = Max {pi∗a0 (s, ch;w), pi∗b0 (s, ch;w)},
where pi∗a0 /pi
∗b
0 is the profit of the establishment if it operates above/below the thresh-
old ntr. These profits are derived as:
pi∗a0 (s, ch;w) = Max
n≥ntr
snθ − (w + τˆ)n+ nexτˆ − cf ,
and
pi∗b0 (s, ch;w) = Max
0≤n≤ntr
snθ − wn− cf .
ACA Effects
With calibrated parameters at hand, I evaluate the effect of the ACA tax on the
aggregate output adding it in the distorted benchmark with the subsidy in place.
The results imply a moderate decrease in the output by 0.13% (Table 1.6, second
column).
In a fashion, similar to the removal of the subsidy, this effect can be decomposed
along intensive and extensive margins. First, to explore the effects of the employer
mandate on the intensive margin, I hold the distribution of establishments fixed as
in the benchmark and adjust the wage rate to clear the labor market. With the
introduced ACA tax, the misallocation of resources across existing establishments
is aggravated because the tax increases the gap between marginal costs faced by
the large establishments sponsoring and not sponsoring HI. The aggregate output
drops by 0.14% compared to the benchmark level which is illustrated in the third
column of Table 1.6. Second, to infer the effects on the extensive margin, I allow
the entry and the exit to endogenously adjust in response to the ACA tax. Once the
distribution of establishments is endogenously determined, the entry increases and the
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exit decreases. Both effects can be attributed to the redistribution of profits from the
large to the small establishments caused by the tax. As a result of such redistribution,
the present discounted value of life-time profits for young and small establishments
increases relative to that for an average incumbent which leads to a higher entry
and a lower exit. Together, these effects combine in a larger number of operating
establishments compared to the benchmark. Nevertheless, it cannot manifest to the
increase in the output and only slightly mitigates output losses caused by the increased
misallocation due to the ACA tax. In this case, the output decreases by 0.13% below
the benchmark (see the second column of Table 1.6). Table 1.6 illustrates the details
regarding these results 24 (all statistics are relative to the benchmark except last four
lines):
24The benchmark wage for this experiment was renormalized to the average annual wage in 2012
(http://www.bls.gov/oes/2012/may/oes_nat.htm) to accommodate a per employee ACA tax of
$2,000.
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Variable Equilibrium Fixed number
effects of establishments
Output, Y˜ 0.9987 0.9986
Y˜ − ctotalh 0.9990 0.9989
Entry, M 1.0004 1
Exit 0.9979 1
Mass of establishments 1.0026 1
Share of establishments:
- unconstrained and not taxed 0.4732 0.4734
- constrained and not taxed 0.0062 0.0062
- taxed 0.0019 0.0019
- sponsoring HI 0.5187 0.5185
Table 1.6: ACA Effects
The magnitude of the reported effects complemented by the fact that the tax of
$2,000 constitutes 4.37% of the equilibrium wage in the full model, it applies to only
0.19% of establishments and constrains 0.62% of them posits a fair question whether
a tax with a limited application as here can give a rise to a large effect on the output,
or it is a variety of confounding effects when the subsidy is in place that limits its
revelation. Though not reported in details, I assess a distortionary power of the ACA
tax introducing it in the economy without the subsidy and applying it in the closest
proximity to the equilibrium corresponding to the third column of Table 1.6. In
particular, I apply a labor cost tax of 4.37% to only those establishments that were
taxed in the equilibrium of the full model. For establishments constrained at ntr, I
allow the endogenous choice between staying constrained and being taxed. All other
establishments are not taxed. In this exercise, the output goes down by 0.03% which
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demonstrates a limited ability of the ACA tax to generate large negative effects on
the output.
1.4 Discussions
1.4.1 Model Assumptions
In this section, I review the assumptions of the model and discuss the alternatives.
Incorporating Capital. When the output is produced with labor and capital in-
puts, the reallocation of labor resources following introduction of the labor cost sub-
sidy for the establishments sponsoring HI is complemented by the reallocation of
capital which can exacerbate the negative effect on the aggregate output.
It turns out that a model with labor and capital where the capital is rented by
the establishments rather than owned and there are no capital adjustment costs is
equivalent to the model with a single labor input endowed with a higher labor share.
To see why, suppose that the production function is given by
y˜t = s˜
1−λ
t (n
α
t k
1−α
t )
λ
where kt is capital traded at a price r and λ < 1.
From the static profit maximization problem of the establishment in the absence
of any distortions, one can solve for kt and, using the optimal solution kt(nt), derive
the establishment’s revenues net of the costs of capital:
yt = s˜
1−λ
t (n
α
t kt(nt)
1−α)λ − rkt(nt) = stnθt
where θ = λα
1−λ(1−α) and st is a function of s˜t, λ, α and r. Then, it is plausible to say
that the production function yt = stn
θ
t represents the relationship between output
and labor after optimally accounting for the capital and predicts the same allocation
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of labor as the model with the capital. Observe, however, that θ is larger than the
labor share λα in the model with the capital.
While two setups, with and without capital, results in the same labor allocations
in the absence of distortions, the fact that yt accounts for the cost of capital might
be a reason why these models deliver different effects in response to the same policy.
In the case of the labor cost subsidy, the proportional change in the establishment
level output y˜t in the model with two inputs is equal to the change in the output yt
predicted by the model with a single labor input as long as θ = λα
1−λ(1−α) . This also
holds for the aggregate output of the economy with establishments varying in their
access to the labor cost subsidy as in this paper. Therefore, the quantitative impact
of the distortion on the gross output I find in the context of the calibrated model is
identical to the one predicted by the model with labor and capital at the background
in which λ and α can be shaped into θ = 0.85 through θ = λα
1−λ(1−α) . One example
would be a production function with parameters λ = 0.9 and α = 0.64.
Static vs. Dynamic Model. It is worthwhile emphasizing that the establish-
ment’s dynamics in the model of this paper is a source of amplification of the distor-
tionary effects of the subsidy through the entry margin. Generally, a static version
of the current model with zero probability of establishment’s survival to the next
period can easily replicate the cross-sectional distributions of size and HI provision
obtained in the benchmark. Note that a static version like that would feature the
benchmark mass of operating establishments comprised of new entrants. Hence, it
would produce the same effects on the output as the calibrated dynamic model under
a fixed distribution of establishments because the elimination of the subsidy would
entail the reallocation of resources across the same mass of existing establishments up
to the point where the marginal products of labor are equalized. At the same time,
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such model would miss the establishment’s size growth and the increase in probabil-
ity of HI provision as the establishments are aging. Therefore, it would only account
for the fact that the subsidy received by mostly large employers redistributes profits
from small to large establishments which still might impact the entry when the dis-
tribution is endogenously determined, but it would overlook the fact that the subsidy
redistributes profits from young to old establishments. Through this channel in the
dynamic model, the profits are postponed into the future which lowers the ex ante
value of entry and reduces the incentives of establishments to enter. Consequently,
the output gains upon the endogenously determined distribution should be larger in
the dynamic version of the model.
To illustrate the quantitative importance of the establishment’s dynamics in am-
plifying the effects of the subsidy, I consider a static version of the model calibrated
to exactly match the cross-sectional distributions of size and HI provision from the
benchmark. In this version, establishments enter drawing the shocks from the bench-
mark steady state distribution of individual states µ(s, ch), produce for one period,
exit and are replaced with new entrants (i.e. the probability of survival is zero) 25 .
With that, the allocations and the distribution of establishments in the static model
coincide with those in the dynamic model in the presence of the subsidy. Next, I com-
pare the output gains from the elimination of the subsidy in the static and dynamic
versions decomposing them into the gains under a fixed and endogenous number of
establishments. Table 1.7 reports the results (relative to the benchmark).
25Note that while a joint distribution of shocks at entry is readily available from the benchmark
steady state distribution of individual states µ(s, ch), the entry cost should be recalibrated so that
the free entry condition is satisfied in the static model.
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Variable Equilibrium Fixed number
effects of establishments
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
model model model model
Gross output, Y 1.0119 1.0213 1.0055 1.0055
Entry, M 1.0429 1.1121 1 1
Exit 1 1.0104 1 1
Mass of establishments 1.0429 1.1006 1 1
Table 1.7: Effects of Eliminating the Subsidy, Static vs. Dynamic Model
Notice that in the static model the distribution of establishments is comprised of
new entrants and, thus, the output after accounting for the cost of entry differs
from the benchmark. Then, even though the output gains in absolute terms are the
same under the fixed distribution in both models, the proportional changes in the
output are not. To highlight that the output gains are identical in the columns 4-5,
I report gross output (aggregate production) rather than the output accounting for
all fixed costs. Columns 2-3 in Table 1.7 demonstrate that dynamics introduces a
sizable amplification effects on entry and output under the endogenous distribution
of establishments. The mass of entrants increases by 4.29% in the static vs. 11.21% in
the dynamic model which boosts the gains in the gross output from 1.19% to 2.13%.
The above discussion suggests that the results of the elimination of the subsidy un-
der the endogenous distribution might be sensitive to how much size and HI provision
growth is embedded in the establishment’s life cycle in the quantitative model. In this
respect, the benchmark economy reproduces well the age profile of the establishments
in the data with reference to size and HI provision. Table A.1 in Appendix A reports
the average size of establishments and a fraction of those sponsoring HI for different
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age categories. Notably, the size growth and the increasing probability of HI provision
over the establishment’s life-time are supported by two model assumptions: persis-
tence of s and ch shocks. Relaxing these assumptions in a way that lowers the size
or HI provision growth over time would result in lower output gains through milder
effects on the number of entrants. For example, under the i.i.d. ch the probability
of HI provision as the establishment ages increases only to the extent that a higher
productivity s raises profits and allows to pay a bigger fixed cost ch. In this case, a
growth of provision over time would be lower compared to the benchmark where the
probability of HI provision increases even in the absence of changes in productivity
s.
1.4.2 Output Gains for Different Subsidy Levels
A crucial determinant of the distortion generated by the tax exemption of the
ESHI premiums in this paper is the size of the subsidy h. My baseline calibrated
value of h is 0.0995 or 9.95% of the wage paid by the establishments not sponsoring
HI. However, the empirical subtleties of calculating HI , HG, τ and τG might affect
the size of the subsidy size given in (1.7). Therefore, it is of interest to compute the
output gains from eliminating the subsidy in the economies characterized by different
values of h in order to account for any biases in the calibrated value. Some examples
may be helpful here to illustrate why the size of the subsidy h might differ from the
calibrated value.
For instance, the calibrated value of h takes into account only tax exempt em-
ployer’s contribution towards HI premiums. At the same time, many employees have
an opportunity to cover the remaining part of the premium with before-tax income
if the employer offers benefits through a section 125 of the Internal Revenue Service
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Code (cafeteria plan) which increases the subsidy 26 . Likewise, many employers offer
employees the option of contributing to flexible spending accounts which permit em-
ployees to make pre-tax contributions to pay for eligible medical expenses 27 . Since
this option is available to the employees through their employers, it contributes to
the subsidization effect accruing to the employers due to the tax exemption of the
employee’s compensation. In a similar way, individually purchased HI plans may be
more expensive than similar plans purchased by the employers having access to the
group insurance market. Thus, the employers may also be entitled to an additional
benefit due to the differences in the prices of HI plans captured in (1.7) through
distinguishing between HI and HG 28 . On the contrary to these examples, one can
argue that because the establishments not sponsoring HI tend to be low productiv-
ity, they are likely to fill in vacancies with low skilled and low paid workers. Thus,
normalizing the value of H by w0, as in the calibration exercise, might exaggerate the
value of the subsidy.
Given these possibilities, I explore the implications of the subsidy varying from
0 to 0.15 or, say differently, from 0 to 15% of the wage paid by the establishments
not sponsoring HI. To do this, I recalibrate the model for each subsidy level retaining
other targets from the calibration section. Note that the parameter values calibrated
simultaneously by solving the model are specific to the value of h. Thus, each alter-
native h requires solving the model and identifying a new set of parameters at which
26This channel might be substantial. For example, in 2012 41% of small firms (3 to 199 workers)
and 91% of larger firms participated in the cafeteria plan. At the same time, the contributions of
employees accounted for 16% and 26% of the premiums for single and family coverage correspond-
ingly. This implies that for the majority of firms the tax exempt compensation is more than 10%
larger than what accounted for in the calibration.
27For example, in 2012 17% of small firms and 76% of large firms offered flexible spending accounts
to the employees.
28Notice that factors like take up ratio of the ESHI by the employees and differences in the cost
of single and family coverage should be taken into account. I do not emphasize them here because
the value of H in the calibration exercise refers to the average per employee payments towards HI
premiums and spreads out total payments towards HI premiums across all employees.
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the model matches the targets. After I obtain the parameter values for each h, I redo
the experiment of dropping the subsidy under the fixed and endogenously determined
distribution of establishments as in Section 1.3.2. Figure 1.1 illustrates the results.
For comparison, I also plot the output predicted by a static version of the model with
endogenously determined entry at each h.
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Figure 1.1: Output Gains for Different Subsidy Levels
One would expect that a larger subsidy h implies larger extent of the misallo-
cation across existing establishments and of the profit redistribution from young to
old establishments. As a result, the output gains from the removal of the subsidy
among the mass of existing establishments and under the endogenous distribution
are expected to increase in h. Figure 1.1 illustrates exactly this point. Moreover, the
output in the full model increases at a higher rate than that under the fixed distri-
bution illustrating a growing importance of the adjustments on the extensive margin
as the subsidy increases. The highest gains in Figure 1.1 correspond to the subsidy
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h = 0.15 and amount 1.88% and 2.72% under a fixed and endogenous distribution of
establishments. Note that the increase in the output in a static model is not nearly
as strong as in the full dynamic model and is almost identical to the output in the dy-
namic model when the distribution of establishments is fixed. In line with a previous
discussion, this demonstrates that a static model misses the redistribution of profits
from young to old establishments induced by the subsidy. Hence, the importance of
the extensive margin in the static environment is very limited which is confirmed by
the quantitative results illustrated in Figure 1.1.
1.4.3 Sources of Consumption Gains for the Consumer
The main prediction from elimination of the tax exemption of ESHI premiums
in Section 1.3.2 is an increase in the aggregate output implying an increase in the
individual and total consumption. I proceed to discuss the sources of consumers’
benefits and mechanisms initiating them.
It is worth noticing that even though consumers in the benchmark receive the
same value, there is a heterogeneity among them with respect to the structure of
the compensation package defined by the HI provision status of the employer. Thus,
the sources of benefits for the consumers affiliated with the employers of different
HI provision statuses may differ. Rather than examining each consumer’s type, I
discuss consumption from the average consumer’s viewpoint. Averaging elements
of the consumer’s budget constraint over consumers of different types, the average
consumption C¯ can be written as 29
C¯ = w¯(1− τ)−HN s0 (w) + Π + T
29The expression for the average consumer’s budget constraint should not be confused with the
expression for the total consumption C given earlier. Even though total consumption is equal to the
average consumption, the expression for C takes into account the relationship between w0 and w1
in (1.5) and is written in terms of the wage rate w denoting w0. The expression for C¯ does not use
(1.5) and retains two types of wage compensation w0 and w1.
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where w¯ = w0N
s
0 (w) + w1N
s
1 (w) is an average wage compensation, N
s
0 (w)/N
s
1 (w) is
the labor supplied to all establishments not sponsoring/sponsoring HI. Notice, that
the expression for C¯ does not distinguish between HI and HG since in the calibrated
model HI = HG = H. Also, the expression takes into account that tax collections on
the premiums paid by the employers τGHN s1 (w) = 0 since τ
G = 0 in the benchmark
and N s1 (w) = 0 in the equilibrium upon subsidy elimination.
Table 1.8 is a supplement to the effects of subsidy elimination in Table 1.5 illus-
trating some components of the average consumption:
Variable Equilibrium Fixed number
effects of establishments
Worker’s compensation 1.1768 1.1586
Profits 0.9498 1.1027
Table 1.8: Components of Average Consumption (Relative to Benchmark)
These results suggest that the benefits of eliminating the tax exemption of ESHI
are encapsulated mainly in the increased compensation. To gain a perspective of
the mechanism, observe that the drop of HI provision by the establishments is asso-
ciated with the shift of HI premiums H from the establishments to the consumers
and elimination of the implicit labor cost subsidy h previously transferred from the
consumers to the establishments in the form of reduced wages. Being compensated
with the equivalent increase in cash wages, the former shift of the premium payments
increases consumer’s compensation but has no impact on the value of the consumer
because wages minus compelled payments of HI premiums stay constant. At the same
time, the latter eliminated incidence of the subsidy h effectively makes the consumers
better off while increasing the labor costs for the establishments. Regardless of the
47
increased labor costs, the aggregate profits of establishments in the fixed distribution
equilibrium in the second column also increase primarily because the allocation of
resources improves which increases the output and establishments’ revenues 30 . In
this allocation, the profits settle at the level where the value of the entrant is larger
than the entry costs which makes the entry profitable. Therefore, when the entry is
allowed to adjust with endogenously determined distribution of establishments in the
last column, the number of entrants increases creating additional demand for labor
and pushing the consumer’s compensation further up. With this, the profits decrease
both because the compensation increases and payments towards the fixed costs of
operation and entry costs pick up when the number of entrants increases.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
The analysis of this paper is motivated by the current tax treatment of the ESHI
premiums in the United States. It is shown to generate an implicit labor cost subsidy
to the employers sponsoring HI when there is a large number of worker competing for
the jobs who can costlessly reallocate between the employers. The main argument of
this paper is that, because provision among employers is not uniform, such subsidy
can reduce the aggregate output through reallocating the labor resources across the
establishments and affecting the number of operating establishments via entry and
exit. Additionally, it is demonstrated quantitatively that the distortionary effect of
the subsidy gets amplified when the related regulation, the ACA employer mandate,
is introduced.
30Obviously, establishments drop HI provision which economizes on the fixed costs of setting up HI
ch and increases profits. Nevertheless, one could consider an alternative scenario where ch payments
would not matter for the aggregate profits while they would still increase reflecting improvements
in the allocation of labor. For instance, one can assume that ch payment are fully shifted from the
establishments to the government who pushes them back onto the establishments in the form of a
lump-sum tax. Then, drop in ch costs paid by the establishments would effectively have no effect
on profits, as well as on consumers’ welfare.
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The essential results of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, the quan-
titative analysis of the model calibrated to the U.S. data suggests that the elimination
of the tax exemption of the ESHI premiums might increase the output by 1.11% if the
distribution of establishments does not change. Second, it may significantly increase
the number of establishments in operation when one accounts for endogeneity of entry
and exit. This may give an additional boost to the output produced upon elimination
of the tax exemption. In the model, the output increases by 1.73% when the distri-
bution of establishments is determined endogenously. It is also demonstrated that
even if the government, who might take upon the responsibility of providing HI, is
less efficient and has to incur a higher cost of setting up HI compared to the private
companies, the output gains from eliminating the tax exemption of ESHI premiums
are still positive. Finally, the estimates of the output gains from the removal of the
subsidy created by the tax exemption in the model calibrated with different levels of
the subsidy indicate that the output can go up as much as 2.72% above the bench-
mark for the subsidy level equivalent to 15% of the average per employee payroll of
establishments not sponsoring HI.
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Chapter 2
MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF HIGHER COST OF HEALTH
SERVICES FOR THE UNEMPLOYED
2.1 Introduction
The majority of privately insured workers in the U.S. obtain their health insur-
ance (HI) through the employment. Along with the benefit of reducing exposure to
financial risk, HI provides access to lower priced health services because insurance
companies contract with medical providers to provide services to their enrollees at
discounted prices. At the same time, for those workers who lose their jobs, employer
benefits including HI end immediately or shortly after leaving the employer. These
individuals suffer a substantial financial loss related to health care as they lose HI
and, therefore, have to pay inflated prices for medical services.
This link between the cost of health services and the employment status of the
worker has potentially important implications for the functioning of the economy.
Because workers lose HI after leaving the employer, higher health care cost for the
uninsured increases the cost associated with unemployment which may be an impedi-
ment for worker’s decision to switch jobs. As a result, the productivity of the economy
as a whole and aggregate output may suffer if individuals who would like to move
are constrained by the high cost of health services during the unemployment spell.
Meanwhile, at the aggregate level, many employed workers might be affected by the
cost of unemployment inflated by the cost of health services when HI is absent. In
the data, the flows of workers out of jobs are accompanied by a substantial number
of separations into unemployment. For example, in 2000-2008, more than 40% of
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workers separated from their jobs annually, and about 35% of these separations were
into unemployment 1 . Because the extent of job reallocations which include unem-
ployment spell is so sizable in the data, aggregate implications of the higher cost of
health services faced by the unemployed workers might be significant. The objective
of this paper is to quantify some of these implications. More specifically, I ask what
are the effects of equalizing the cost of health services faced by the employed and the
unemployed on labor market outcomes, aggregate labor productivity and aggregate
output.
To address this question, I build a general equilibrium search model in the tradition
of Lucas and Prescott (1974) island model where all workers are required to pay
extra cost of health services contingent on the worker’s employment status. In the
model, the employed workers are assumed to face a lower cost of health services
as compared with the unemployed. This assumption is motivated by two empirical
observations. First observation relates to the evidence on the existing gap in the
cost of health services between privately insured and the uninsured. In the paper,
I examine aggregate hospital care statistics reported by the Healthcare Cost and
Utilization Project (HCUP) and the American Hospital Association (AHA) which
indicate that medical bills for the insured are about 50% discounted compared to the
uninsured who are subject to a full charge 2 . Second supporting empirical observation
points out to a bigger prevalence of lacking HI among the unemployed. For instance,
51% of the unemployed adults aged 18-64 years did not have HI compared with 18.2%
of employed in the same age group in 2009-2010 (Driscoll and Bernstein (2012)).
1Annual levels for total separations and separations into unemployment are the sum of the 12
monthly levels. Average monthly separation rates for 2000-2008 were calculated using Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) data series on job turnover, https://www.bls.gov/jlt/. Average monthly
employment-unemployment transition rates were calculated based on the BLS data retrieved from
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_flows.htm.
2As mentioned before, the primary reason for this difference is the ability of insurance companies
to negotiate lower rates for the insured.
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In the course of analyzing the effects of the higher cost of health services for the
unemployed, I first turn to a simple version of the model which allows for analytical
representation of some results and provides important insights regarding the potential
effects of the gap between the cost of health services in the employment and unem-
ployment states in the full model. In this version of the model, the productivity of
the island fluctuates between two values (high and low). Naturally, the mobility of
workers is directed from the islands hit by the low productivity shock to the islands
experiencing high productivity. The model demonstrates that increase in the cost of
health services for the unemployed operates through two channels. First, it reduces
mobility of workers leading to lower unemployment. Second, it worsens the allocation
of workers across islands because higher cost of health services during unemployment
induces the workers to stay in their locations after the island is hit by the low produc-
tivity shock. These two channels create an obvious trade-off: while the first channel
tends to increase aggregate production, the second one reduces the level of output.
Therefore, the interaction between these channels may cause aggregate output go ei-
ther way. Quantitative exploration of the simple model shows that the second effect
dominates and overall aggregate output decreases in the cost of health services faced
by the unemployed as long as the time discount factor is sufficiently high.
While the same trade-off operates in a setup with a richer process for the produc-
tivity shocks, the quantitative importance of two channels might be affected in the
presence of discounting. To address this issue, I move to a full model featuring mul-
tiple levels of the productivity shock and quantitatively investigate the magnitude of
the effects discussed in the simple model. The model preserves the structure of Lucas
and Prescott (1974) island model with varying costs of health services for the workers
contingent on their employment status and, additionally, introduces unemployment
insurance payments available to the unemployed. Because the model cannot be solved
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analytically, I undertake a calibration exercise to mimic selected observations on the
U.S. economy. The important part of the calibration procedure is that I use the
differences in the cost of health services for the privately insured and the uninsured
inferred from the aggregate hospital statistics as the gap between the cost of health
services faced by the employed and the unemployed in the benchmark. After the
model is calibrated, I seek to understand the importance of equalizing the costs of
health services across worker in the numerical experiment which reduces the cost of
health services for the unemployed to the level faced by the employed. Quantitative
results show that, similar to the simple model, change in the output is determined by
a composition of changes in unemployment and allocation of workers across islands.
Since lower cost of health services for the unemployed encourages worker to search
more, the economy with equalized costs of health services is characterized by unem-
ployment about 1.5 percentage points higher as compared with the benchmark. At
the same time, due to the increased willingness of workers to search, the allocation of
labor across islands or the composition of undertaken jobs improves as more workers
are prone to leave their islands after experiencing low productivity shock. This leads
to an increase in aggregate labor productivity by about 1.2%. Although the second
effect increases aggregate output on its’ own, the first one, increased unemployment,
is quantitatively of a first order importance which leads to a decrease in aggregate
output by 0.26%.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 provides evi-
dence on the gap in the cost of health services faced by the insured and the uninsured.
Section 2.3 presents a simple model which illustrates the main trade-off between un-
employment and allocative efficiency when employed and unemployed are subject to
different costs of health services. Section 2.4 presents full equilibrium model. Cal-
ibration strategy and results of the numerical experiment equalizing costs of health
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services for the employed and the unemployed are discussed in Section 2.5. Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Evidence on the Gap Between the Cost of Health Services for the Privately
Insured and the Uninsured
In this section, I examine the evidence on the gap in the rates paid for the medical
services by different payers. The attention is concentrated on the gap faced by the
uninsured and holders of private insurance to be used later in the calibration section
of the paper.
It is a common practice that providers of medical services have a detailed and very
comprehensive list of charges for medical services. These charges vary across providers
and are used to determine a price of individual’s medical condition (or a treatment)
by adjusting for the intensity and a combination of received services. Then, the final
charge of the treatment is billed to a payer (either to a patient or HI provider).
Uninsured and other self-pay recipients 3 of medical services are presented with and
expected to pay medical bills reflecting a full charge. Amounts paid by insurance
companies of behalf of the patients are usually discounted and represent a result of
the negotiation between the insurer and the medical services provider. In general,
insurance companies may negotiate prices with every provider on every treatment,
procedure or medical service on every plan. Aside from the fact that negotiated
prices are not readily available to the public 4 , multiplicity of the negotiated prices
creates a challenge for measuring differences in the cost of medical services for different
3Apart from the uninsured, individuals who qualify for the full charge are those whose HI
provider does not have a contract with the medical service provider: international visitors, people
whose health plans are lacking contract with the service provider, etc. Uninsured contribute a
majority of self-pay patients. Therefore, I neglect potential biases in the aggregate statistics due to
a detailed categorization of self-pay patients.
4To extract rents, the insurers and providers prefer that their competitors do not know the
prices.
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payers in the data. To my knowledge, data on the amounts billed to and paid by
the privately insured and the uninsured for a comparable set of medical services
are not available. Nevertheless, disintegrated pieces of information on hospital care
can provide an insight onto the gap in the rates. The rest of this section discusses
frequently used financial statistics on inpatient hospital care on the aggregate level 5
and utilizes them to approximate the differences in the cost of health services for the
privately insured and the uninsured.
A common statistics used in financial reports of the hospital industry is a charge-
to-cost ratio (CCR):
Charge-to-Cost Ratio (CCR) =
Charge
Cost
.
CCR measures charges billed to patients (Charge) relative to the Medicare allowable
cost of medical services (Cost). It should be noted that the latter Medicare allowable
cost is the cost of providing care determined by the Center of Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) which applies to all patients, not only those covered by Medicare or
Medicaid 6 . Therefore, the ratio measures the magnitude of the markup that the
hospitals charge to all patients collectively.
The average CCRs for the hospitals in the U.S. for the period 2001 through 2012
are shown below in Figure 2.1. The series is constructed based on the information
provided by the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project for the national inpatient
sample in HCUP Cost-to-Charge Ratio Files (2012). The average is calculated using
5According to National Health Expenditure Accounts (2012), hospital care accounted for 32.3%
of the national health expenditures or 38.2% of the personal health care expenditures in the United
States in 2012. Other personal care expenditures include professional services (26.6% of national
health expenditures), nursing homes and home care (8.1%), retail outlet sales of medical products
(12.8%) and other health, residential, and personal care including program administration and net
cost of private health insurance, and government public health activities (14.9%).
6The cost calculated by CMS includes only cost associated with patient’s care while hospitals
may incur additional expenditures attributed to cost which are not related to the patient care directly
(for example, cost of amenities).
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hospital-specific CCRs from the files which are based on all-payer, inpatient cost and
charge information from the detailed reports of hospitals to the CMS. For hospitals
with missing information about hospital-specific CCR, I use group average CCR also
reported in HCUP Cost-to-Charge Ratio Files (2012). The group average CCR repre-
sents a weighted average for the hospitals in the group (defined by state, urban/rural,
investor-owned/other, and number of beds) using the proportion of beds in the group
as the weight for each hospital.
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Figure 2.1: Average Charge-to-Cost Ratios for the U.S. Hospitals
The markup embedded in CCR can be viewed as an upper bound for the difference
in the cost of health services faced by the insured and uninsured if the uninsured are
billed and pay the charges in full according to CCR and insured face no markup.
For example, Figure 2.1 illustrates that CCR for 2012 is approximately 2.8 which
suggests that prices of medical services for the uninsured could be 2.8 times higher
than for the insured. However, rather than postulating that the insured cover the
cost with no markup, more careful analysis is needed which should take into account
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actual levels of reimbursing care by the insurance holders. This section proceeds
inspecting additional statistics from the hospital industry to pin down health care
payments relative to the cost for different categories of payers and, in particular, for
the privately insured. Then, to infer the discounts for the privately insured in a final
step, I compare estimated reimbursement level for the privately insured (payments
relative to the cost) and average CCR in the data (throughout this section, the
uninsured are assumed to pay full charges in accordance with CCR).
If hospitals were to collect a markup suggested by Figure 2.1, even after adjusting
for the facts that 1) Medicare allowable costs might underestimate expenses perceived
by hospitals as a cost and 2) markups for the outpatient care might be lower 7 ,
this would imply that the profit margin of the hospital industry (ratio of profits to
revenues) must be high. For instance, if revenues were equal to the charges, the
implied profit margin would be:
Profit Margin =
Revenue - Cost
Revenue
=
Charge - Cost
Charge
= 1− CCR−1.
Then, the average CCR for 2012 from Figure 2.1 would yield a profit margin of 64.6%.
However, the data suggests it is much lower. Figure 2.2 exhibits aggregate total and
operating hospital margins reported by the American Hospital Association (AHA) 8
:
7Outpatient care is a substantial part of hospital services. In the data, the proportion of out-
patient services in the total revenues of the hospital industry has increased from 28% in 1994 to
46% in 2014. To my knowledge, statistics similar to CCR are not reported for the outpatient care.
Therefore, I omit the discussion of outpatient care and assume that prices for outpatient care for
different payers are determined in the same way as for the inpatient care.
8Source: Trendwatch Chartbook 2014. Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health System (2014).
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Figure 2.2: Aggregate Total and Operating Hospital Margins
The margins are calculated as the difference between total net revenue/operating rev-
enue 9 and total expenses divided by total net revenue/operating revenue. According
to Figure 2.2, aggregate total and operating margins for 2012 were 7.8% and 6.5% as
opposed to 64.6% implied by the average CCR. Therefore, actual revenues are lower
than the charges. Say differently, not all payers are subject to a full charge, and
reimbursement levels for some of them can be significantly lower than CCR.
A statistics which determines reimbursement level for the payer is called a payment-
to-cost ratio (PCR). Unlike CCR, PCR is a ratio of payments received from a payer,
not billed, to the cost of providing care:
Payment-to-Cost Ratio (PCR) =
Payments
Cost
.
Generally, if PCRs for all categories of insured were known, then it would be straight-
forward to calculate the discounts comparing CCR and PCRs for each category. In
9Revenues are derived from activities related to the provision of health care for the patients.
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the absence of the information about PCR for the privately insured, I retrieve it from
profit margins using some assumptions outlined below.
The relationship between profit margin and PCRs for individual payer groups can
be established if the profit margin is expressed in the following way:
Profit Margin =
∑
i
(Paymentsi − Costi) ·Ni∑
i
Paymentsi ·Ni
where Paymentsi and Costi are, correspondingly, payments and cost for the unit of
care for payer i, Ni is the number of units of care delivered to payer i. If the cost of a
unit of care is the same for all payers Costi = Cost, which effectively means that the
composition of received health care services does not differ across payers, the above
expression for the profit margin can be written as:
Profit Margin = 1−
Cost
∑
i
Ni∑
i
Paymentsi ·Ni
= 1−
∑
i
Paymentsi
Cost
· Ni∑
i
Ni
−1 .
The first term under the sum sign in the brackets is the PCR for group i. The second
term represents the fraction of health care services received by group i. Then, it
follows that:
Profit Margin = 1−
(∑
i
PCRi · fi
)−1
where fi =
Ni∑
i
Ni
is the proportion of health services provided to group i.
To find PCR for the privately insured relying on this expression, it suffices to know
PCRs for all other categories of payers and the distribution of delivered care across
payers. At the aggregate level, the following categories of payers are distinguished:
Medicare and Medicaid holders, private payers including holders of private insurance
and uninsured, uncompensated care, other government programs and non-patient
costs. Next, I discuss some data and assumptions made regarding PCRs for these
individual payers and the distribution of health care services.
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As often claimed, a potential reason for low profitability margins of health care
providers is the provision of care for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries which is re-
imbursed at lower rates as compared with other payers. In general, payment rates for
Medicare and Medicaid with exception of managed care plans are set by the law rather
than through a negotiation and may be even below the associated costs. Data for
2012 indicates that PCRs for Medicare and Medicaid 10 were correspondingly 85.9%
and 88.9% (Trendwatch Chartbook 2014. Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health
System (2014)). These ratios imply that hospitals received payment of 85.9 cents/
88.9 cents for every dollar spent on Medicare/Medicaid patients in 2012 indicating
underpayments for the care supplied under these programs 11 . Similar to Medicare
and Medicaid, other government programs might be reimbursed at low rates. Thus,
I assume that government programs and non-patient costs are compensated at the
cost without markup (PCR is equal to 100%). As mentioned before, the uninsured
are assumed to be subject to a full charge and pay in accordance with CCR (for cal-
culations, I take PCR to be equal to the average CCR of 280% in 2012). Generally,
hospitals may discount services for the uninsured on the case-by-case basis or provide
charity care. However, most of the uninsured do not receive this privilege. A lot of
times it happens because uninsured patients are not aware of such options or because
negotiating prices on an individual basis with hospitals is considered a costly action
making it more difficult to access care. Moreover, charity care may not necessarily be
10Payments here include managed care.
11At the same time, these programs are big which could substantially lower hospital’s profit
profits. According to Trendwatch Chartbook 2014. Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health System
(2014), in 2012 Medicare and Medicaid contributed correspondingly 39.7% and 16.3% to the overall
hospital care costs (include both inpatient and outpatient care). If one were to account for the
proportion of costs and PCRs attributed to Medicare and Medicaid and assume that other payers
pay in full in accordance with CCR, the implied profit margin for 2012 would be approximately
approximately 42.3% which explains a large portion of the deviation of the observed profit margins
in data from the one derived from CCR. However, the observed profit margin are far from being
fully explained with the adjustment for underpayments by Medicare and Medicaid which suggests
that payments from other payers, including privately insured, are lower than the charges.
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aimed to only uninsured 12 and, at the aggregate level, it is included as a component
of uncompensated care. Therefore, there is no convincing evidence that the uninsured
face prices lower than the charges. Finally, I assume that uncompensated care is not
reimbursed (PCR = 0).
I take the distribution of overall hospital care costs 13 across payers to represent
the distribution of provided care. According to Trendwatch Chartbook 2014. Trends
Affecting Hospitals and Health System (2014), in 2012 Medicare and Medicaid con-
tributed correspondingly 39.7% and 16.3% to the overall hospital care costs along
with 34% contributed by private payers, 6.1% by uncompensated care, 1.8% by other
government programs and 2.2% by non-patient costs. To split the cost attributed to
private payers between privately insured and uninsured, I use their share in the na-
tional inpatient costs. The distribution of national inpatient costs by primary payers
bears a close similarity with the distribution of total costs including outpatient care.
In 2012, 46% of inpatient costs were attributed to Medicare, 16% to Medicaid, 29% to
private insurance, 5% to the uninsured, 4% to other costs. Note that private payers
which include privately insured and uninsured account for exactly 34% of inpatient
care as they do in the total costs including outpatient care. Thus, I assume that 5%
of the overall hospital costs are spent on the care for the uninsured and 29% on the
privately insured.
Expression for the profit margin combined with assumptions regarding rates of
compensating care by different payers and the distribution of hospital care costs
allows to compute that payments from privately insured patients (PCR) need to be
143.9% or 138.7% of the cost of care provided to them to obtain the profit margins
12For example, Uninsured and Overcharged: How Advocate Health Care Overcharges Chicago
Hospital Patients (2003) mentions that only about half of charity care was supplied to the uninsured
in Cook County in 2003.
13These costs include both inpatient and outpatient care.
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observed in the data for 2012. Therefore, since the uninsured are assumed to pay
a full charge or 280% of the cost, privately insured face health care prices 49.1% or
50.9% lower than the uninsured 14 . Section 2.5.1 uses these differences in the cost of
medical services for the privately insured and uninsured to calibrate the gap in the
cost of health services face by the employed and unemployed.
2.3 Simple Model
In this section, I write a simple model to offer insights onto the effects of higher
prices of health services faced by the unemployed who lose access to HI upon leav-
ing the employer on the labor market outcomes, aggregate labor productivity and
aggregate output. The model modifies Lucas and Prescott (1974) island model with
directed search by requiring all agents incur extra costs of medical services in every
period. This cost is correlated with the employment status of the worker. More
specifically, I explicitly assume that employed worker has access to HI through the
employment and, thus, faces a lower cost of medical services. Once the worker leaves
the island and becomes unemployed, she loses access to the private insurance, be-
comes uninsured until employed on an other island and faces a higher cost of health
services. Discussion below suppresses time index for all variables since the analysis
is focused on the comparison of stationary equilibria with reallocation of the workers
between islands.
14There is some fragmented evidence in Uninsured and Overcharged: How Advocate Health Care
Overcharges Chicago Hospital Patients (2003) confirming the discounts I obtain here. The average
inpatient profit margin per uninsured discharge for Cook County residents was 55.1% and average
provider insurance discount was 60% in 2001. This evidence is along the lines of profit margin
of 64.6% on the uninsured and a discount of about 50% for the privately insured in the analysis
conducted in this paper.
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2.3.1 Environment
Consider an economy where ex-ante identical risk-neutral workers of measure 1
are hired by a continuum of labor markets, or islands, of measure 1. Here, the islands
are defined as occupations. Each island has access to a decreasing return technology:
F (n, z) = znγ, (2.1)
which is a function of island-specific productivity, z, and labor input, n, with a
parameter of the decreasing return to scale γ, γ < 1. To obtain analytical results, in
this section I simplify the exposition and assume that island’s productivity fluctuates
between two values z1 and z2, z1 < z2, in accordance with a transition function Q,
s.t. Q(zi|zi) = pi. Workers are assumed to own an equal share of aggregate profits Π
and receive an equal lump-sum transfer from the government T .
There is no long-term employment relationship between an island and a worker.
Thus, workers are rehired by the islands of worker’s choosing in every period. If the
worker stays on the island where she is currently located, she produces consumption
good, receives island-specific wage and starts the next period in the same location.
Otherwise, she needs to undergo one period of unemployment before joining her
preferred island. During this period, the worker obtains no wage. Transitioning
workers arrive to the destination island of their choosing at the end of the period,
after production is complete. In other words, the unemployed workers do not produce
in the current period and start the next period on the island of their choosing before
realizations of the next period’s productivity shocks are observed. This assumption
implies that, in the current period, the island cannot employ more workers than the
total number of workers located on the island at the beginning of the period, x.
In this economy, the state of the island, (x, z), is defined by the number of people
who start period on the island before anyone leaves/arrives, x, and current period
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productivity level, z. Islands represent competitive labor markets implying that the
workers take wages as given and island-specific wage is equal to the marginal product
of the employed workers denoted as:
w(g(x, z), z) = F1(g(x, z), z) = zf(g(x, z)) = zγ(g(x, z))
γ−1,
where g(x, z) is the employment level after workers’ decisions to stay/leave have been
made, F1(·, ·) is a first order derivative of the production function F with respect to
the first argument, and f(x) = γxγ−1.
Assume that, in every period, workers bear additional cost of health services
perfectly correlated with their employment status. The main purpose for introducing
this cost is to create an environment in which the cost of being unemployed are higher
due to the loss of HI accompanied by a higher cost of health services. Denote this
cost He if the worker is employed and Hu > He if the worker is unemployed. Also,
assume that Hu and He are collected by the government and distributed back to all
workers through an equal lump-sum transfer T .
2.3.2 Stationary Equilibrium
In the stationary equilibrium with two levels of productivity shock, island’s labor
force (number of workers starting the period on the island) and employment lie in the
set {x1, x2}, x2 > x1. In other words, labor force and employment switch back and
forth between x1 and x2. The employment adjusts instantaneously to x1 following
negative productivity shock on the island with the labor force x2 since the workers
can leave the island before production takes place. In this case, the next period’s
labor force of an island is equal to x1. However, the employment remains equal to
x1 on the island characterized by a labor force x1 following positive productivity
shock because the unemployed workers arrive on the island only at the end of the
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period. In this case, next period’s labor force of an island is equal to x2. Islands
whose productivity does not change from previous to the current period maintain
their employment and next period labor force equal to the current period labor force.
Intuitively, if it was optimal to move to/leave these islands, it should have occurred in
the previous periods. Therefore, the workers have no incentives to reallocate from/on
these islands.
In a stationary equilibrium with reallocations, an island is in one of the following
states:
1. (x1, z1): no workers leave and no arrive, the employment is g(x1, z1) = x1 and
the next period labor force is x1;
2. (x2, z1): some workers leave and no arrive, the employment is g(x2, z1) = x1
and the next period labor force is x1;
3. (x1, z2): no workers leave and some arrive, the employment is g(x1, z2) = x1
and the next period labor force is x2;
4. (x2, z2): no workers leave and no arrive, the employment is g(x2, z2) = x2 and
the next period labor force is x2.
In the stationary equilibrium, the mass of islands in each state is given by the station-
ary distribution λ(x, z) and mobility of workers is directed from the islands (x2, z1)
to the islands (x1, z2).
The values of the workers who have decided to stay on their islands are given by
the following system of Bellman equations where employment levels and next period
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labor force for each island (x, z)are taken into account:
V (x1, z1) = z1f(x1)−He + β [p1V (x1, z1) + (1− p1)V (x1, z2)] ,
V (x2, z1) = z1f(x1)−He + β [p1V (x1, z1) + (1− p1)V (x1, z2)] ,
V (x1, z2) = z2f(x1)−He + β [p2V (x2, z2) + (1− p2)V (x2, z1)] ,
V (x2, z2) = z2f(x2)−He + β [p2V (x2, z2) + (1− p2)V (x2, z1)] .
(2.2)
Here, the discount factor is denoted β. Additionally, I suppress worker’s share in
aggregate profits and government transfer because these are equal among the workers
and, thus, have no effect on mobility decisions of risk-neutral workers.
As mentioned before, in the equilibrium with reallocations the workers move from
the islands (x2, z1) to the islands (x1, z2). Therefore, the value of staying on the island
(x2, z1) is equal to the value of being unemployed (the workers remaining on the island
have to be indifferent between moving and staying). Also, the future discounted value
of being unemployed is equal to the future discounted value of the worker on the island
(x1, z2), the destination island of the transitioning worker (transitioning workers have
to be indifferent between staying unemployed and being employed). Therefore, taking
into account that the unemployed have to incur the cost of health services Hu, it
follows that
V (x2, z1) = −Hu + β [p2V (x2, z2) + (1− p2)V (x2, z1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of being unemployed
, (2.3)
where the right-hand side of the expression represent the value of being unemployed.
Combining (2.2) and (2.3) yields the following equilibrium relationship between
x1 and x2 (a detailed equilibrium characterization is provided in Appendix B):
f(x1)(z1 + β(1− p1)z2)− βp2z2f(x2) + (Hu −He)(1 + β − β(p1 + p2)) = 0.
Given the reallocation technology (search friction) faced by the workers, the output
maximizing allocation of workers across islands can be computed as a solution for the
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following problem:
Max
x1,x2
λ(x1, z1)F (x1, z1) + λ(x1, z2)F (x1, z2) + λ(x2, z1)F (x1, z1) + λ(x2, z2)F (x2, z2)
s.t. [λ(x1, z1) + λ(x2, z1)]x1 + [λ(x1, z2) + λ(x2, z2)]x2 = 1.
The last expression is a feasibility constraint which states that the number of
workers located on the islands at the end of the period has to be equal to the total
number of workers in the economy. As in the description of the equilibrium, there is
no movement of workers on the islands (x1, z1) and (x2, z2). Therefore, these islands
have correspondingly x1 and x2 workers at the end of the period, equal to what they
have started with. The workers are reallocated away from the islands (x2, z1) which
implies that islands in this state have x1 workers at the end of the period. Finally,
transitioning workers are allocated on the islands (x1, z2) which end the period with
x2 workers.
Given this problem of maximizing aggregate output, it is possible to show that
(Appendix C contains a formal proof):
Proposition 1 If β is sufficiently close to 1, then equilibrium allocation maximizes
aggregate output when Hu = He.
Proposition 1 implies that an ongoing reallocation in the competitive equilibrium
fails to maximize aggregate output when workers take forward-looking mobility de-
cisions if Hu > He. Intuitively, since workers face a higher cost of health services
in the unemployment state, they attach a higher value to the employment on the
islands with low productivity z1 because the labor mobility occurring when the island
experiences high productivity z2 is costly. As a result, the allocation of labor across
islands worsens which leads to a lower aggregate output.
To better understand the source of inefficiency, it is worth noting that an increased
gap between Hu and He decreases unemployment. Because the workers attach a
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higher value to the islands which do not expose them to a costly unemployment, i.e.
to the low productivity islands in this setup, the employment level x1 on the islands
(x1, z1), (x2, z1), (x1, z2) increases, and the employment x2 on the islands (x2, z2) goes
down. Therefore, the mobility of workers, as well as unemployment, decreases. This
property is demonstrated numerically in Figure 2.3 where I vary value of Hu for a
fixed set of other parameters. Generally, an arbitrary set of parameters generating
an equilibrium with reallocations could be used to show a decrease in unemployment
when Hu increases as compared with He. Thus, I omit a detailed discussion of the
choice of the parameter values and only mention that parameters are selected to
resemble U.S. economy and match the targets discussed in Section 2.5.1 (details on
the parameterization of the two-period model are provided in Appendix D).
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Unemployment for Different Values of Hu in the Two-Period
Model
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While decrease in unemployment on its’ own could generate an increase in the
output, labor productivity (output per worker) decreases when Hu increases. The
primary reason for a decrease in labor productivity is that the allocation of labor
across islands deteriorates. To see why, notice that the first-best allocation occurs
when the marginal products (costs) of labor are equalized across islands. Then, even
when Hu = He, the search friction associated with a period of unemployment during
the transition results in the gap in the marginal costs of labor between departure and
destination islands. As a result, the allocation of labor across islands moves away
from its’ first-best and aggregate labor productivity decreases. A higher cost of health
services for the unemployed further increases the cost associated with unemployment
and attaches workers to the islands that they would leave otherwise. As a results,
the gap in the marginal costs of labor between departure and destination island
is amplified. Therefore, the labor allocation across islands deteriorates and labor
productivity goes down even further. To demonstrate this property, Figures 2.4 and
2.5 display variance in the marginal costs of labor across islands and aggregate labor
productivity for different levels of Hu (values are reported relative to those under
Hu = He).
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Figure 2.4: Variance in the Marginal Costs of Labor Across Islands for Different
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0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
1.02
H
u
/H
e
La
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
ivi
ty
 
 
No difference between H
u
 and H
e
Resembles U.S. economy
Figure 2.5: Labor Productivity for Different Values of Hu in the Two-Period Model
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Figures 2.4 shows that variance in the marginal cost of labor across islands in-
creases in Hu signaling about worse allocation of workers as compared with the first-
best. These changes in the allocation of workers are reflected in the lower labor
productivity in Figures 2.5 which decreases as Hu increases.
The two forces, decreased unemployment and decreased labor productivity, op-
erate in opposite directions and create a natural source of ambiguity regarding the
effects on aggregate output. Nevertheless, when Hu > He, a decreased labor produc-
tivity dominates and the aggregate output decreases in Hu. This result is demon-
strated in Figure 2.6. Additionally, analytical results in Appendix E confirm graphical
analysis performed in this section 15 .
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Figure 2.6: Aggregate Output for Different Values of Hu in the Two-Period Model
15Comparative statics results for the aggregate output are obtained for the case when β is close
to 1.
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It is worth noting that the value of the β used to obtain results in Figures 2.3 - 2.6 is
equal to 0.9898, which is distinctly different but close to 1. Nevertheless, Figure 2.6
demonstrates that, even in the presence of discounting effects, the output maximizing
level of Hu is close to He.
Needless to say, that two-state process for the productivity of the island in this
section is a simplification allowing to highlight the trade-off between effects on un-
employment and labor productivity produced by the gap between Hu and He. In
a more realistic setup, a richer structure for the productivity process of the island
could be desirable. At the same time, analytical results suggesting that output max-
imizing allocation occurs when Hu is close to He and, thus, that equalizing Hu and
He leads to an increase in aggregate output, are conditional on a simple case of
two-state productivity process in the absence of discounting. In a framework with a
discounting, which is further enriched by a more complex productivity shock process,
the impact of equalizing the Hu and He is harder to predict. Therefore, to quan-
tify the effects of equalizing Hu and He in the data, in the next section I frame a
full model which features more complex structure of the productivity shock process,
as well as unemployment insurance payments to the unemployed. Inclusion of the
latter unemployment insurance is justified not only because it is an integral compo-
nent of the U.S. economic system, but also because it affects the differences in the
net non-wage payments received/paid by the employed and unemployed which might
influence worker’s mobility decisions. Then, I parameterize the full model so that
predictions of the model are consistent with observations for the U.S. economy and
evaluate the effects of the policy eliminating the gap in the cost of health services for
the employed and unemployed on unemployment, aggregate labor productivity and
aggregate output.
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2.4 The Main Model
This section considers a full equilibrium model which, along with varying costs
of medical services faced by individuals in different employment states, incorporate
unemployment insurance benefits.
2.4.1 Economy
The model resembles the main features of the economic environment described
in Section 2.3. Namely, the production takes place on the islands using labor as an
input in a decreasing return to scale production technology. At the beginning of a
period after shocks are realized workers decide whether to stay on the island or leave
it. If a worker decides to stay, then she engages in the production, receives labor
income and pays costs of medical services He. If worker decides to leave, she becomes
unemployed in the current period and arrives to the island of her choice at the end
of the period after production stage is complete. The unemployed are required to
pay the cost of health services Hu. Different from Section 2.3, I assume that every
unemployed receives unemployment benefits b.
As before, production function of an island if of the form (2.1) and island-specific
productivity shocks follow Markov process given by the transition function Q(z′|z).
The state of an island is described by a pair (x, z) where x is a population (labor force)
on the island at the beginning of the period before workers leave, and z is a current
period productivity of the island. Wage on the island (x, z) is denoted w(g(x, z), z)
and is determined as w(g(x, z), z) = F1(g(x, z), z) where g(x, z) is the equilibrium
employment level, F1(·, ·) is a first order derivative of the production function F with
respect to the first argument. Production function (2.1) implies that wages are given
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by:
w(g(x, z), z) = zγ(g(x, z))γ−1. (2.4)
The value of the worker finding herself on the island (x, z) at the beginning of
the period, denoted by V (x, z) , represents her decision whether to stay or leave.
If the worker leaves, she becomes unemployed. The value of leaving the island is
equal to the present value of unemployment benefits net of the cost of health services
incurred while being unemployed, Hu, plus future discounted value of employment on
the island of her choice, denoted by θ and determined in equilibrium. If the worker
decides to stay, she earns labor income, pays cost of health services He and begins
next period in the same location.
The problem faced by the worker on the island (x, z) is described by the following
Bellman equation:
V (x, z) = max {b−Hu + θ, w(g(x, z), z)−He + βE [V (x′, z′)|x, z]} .
where z′ stands for the next period’s realization of the productivity shock, and x′
denotes the next period’s labor force available on the island (number of workers
starting the next period on the island).
For a given value of θ, consider the following cases which might occur.
Case 1. No workers leave and no arrive. Then, x′ = x, g(x, z) = x and yjr value
of the worker is
V (x, z) = w(x, z)−He + βE [V (x, z′)|x, z] .
Lack of new arrivals means that continuation value of a worker on the island
is lower than continuation value of the unemployed θ (otherwise, some unemployed
would arrive on the island). In other words,
βE [V (x, z′)|x, z] ≤ θ.
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Case 2. All workers stay and some arrive. Then, x′ > x, g(x, z) = x and the value
of the worker starting period in this location is
V (x, z) = w(x, z)−He + βE [V (x′, z′)|x, z] .
Workers arrive until the continuation value of a worker on the island is equalized
to the continuation value of unemployed:
βE [V (x′, z′)|x, z] = θ.
which determines next period’s population on the island, x′, and permits a simpler
expression for the value of a worker:
V (x, z) = w(x, z)−He + θ.
Case 3. Some workers leave and no arrive. Then, x′ = g(x, z) < x and the value
of the worker starting on the island is given by
V (x, z) = b−Hu + θ.
In this case, workers leave until the present discounted value of the worker staying on
the island is equalized to the value of being unemployed, i.e.:
w(x′, z)−He + βE [V (x′, z′)|x, z] = b−Hu + θ.
This equation determines the next period’s population on the island, x′.
Combining all these cases, one arrives at the following Bellman equation which
describes the problem faced by the worker on the island (x, z):
V (x, z) = max {b−Hu + θ, w(x, z)−He + min {θ, βE [V (x, z′)|x, z]}} . (2.5)
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2.4.2 Equilibrium
For a given value of θ, let the distribution of islands at a point of time be given
by λt(x, z; θ). Then, there exists next period’s distribution of islands, λt+1(x, z; θ),
consistent with optimal mobility decisions of individuals and transition function for
productivity shocks. If optimal decision rules involve reallocations of agents across
islands, then there exists a unique stationary distribution of islands λ(x, z; θ). The
economy-wide labor market clearing condition equates total labor force of 1 and
population (labor force) of all islands which pins down the value of θ in equilibrium:∫ ∫
xλ(x, z; θ)dxdz = 1. (2.6)
Definition. An equilibrium is a set of functions V (·) representing the value func-
tion of a worker, g(·) representing optimal island’s employment, λ(·) describing the
distribution of islands across states, w(·) representing wages and the continuation
value of unemployment θ such that:
- Given the price function w(·) and the value of being unemployed θ, functions
V (·) and g(·) maximize individual’s utility (solve equation (2.5)).
- Wages w(·) on every island are determined competitively, i.e. the workers on
every island are paid their marginal product of labor in accordance with (2.4).
- Invariant distribution λ(·) is consistent with island’s optimal employment levels
and transition functions Q.
- Economy-wide labor market clearing condition (2.6) is satisfied.
- The government budget is balanced:
T + (1− U)He + UHu − Ub = 0,
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where U is the mass of unemployed workers (workers transitioning between
islands), T is government transfer.
2.5 Policy Experiment
The primary interest of this section is to study implications of varying cost of
health services for the unemployment rate, aggregate labor productivity and aggre-
gate output. It is accomplished by comparing steady state outcomes of the benchmark
economy featuring different costs of health services for the worker of different employ-
ment statuses with the outcomes of the economy where policies towards eliminating
gaps in the costs of medical services are implemented.
There is a number of ways in which these gaps may be removed. The most
obvious one is to provide HI to all uninsured. The negotiated prices would then
apply universally and the argument of different rates would lose its’ relevance. This
is a direction in which Affordable Care Act is able to address higher rates charged
to the uninsured by providing easier access to HI. Possible alternatives include a
requirement for all payers to pay a single rate listed on the chargemaster files of
medical care providers or subsidizing differences in the rates for the uninsured.
The first of the suggested policies implies lowering down prices toward their lower
end while the second option is different in bumping up the prices for all payers to-
wards their upper end. Third option preserves the gap in the rates while equalizing
cost of health services through subsidies. In the environment considered here, it is
not essential what kind of policy to study. Equal cost of health services, independent
on the policy approach, have no effect on worker’s mobility decisions and allocative
efficiency if financed through non-distortionary taxes whenever necessary 16 . There-
16In the last policy scenario, the way in which the subsidy is financed may play an important role
for the quantitative results. Nevertheless, since the focus of the paper is to understand the effects
of equalizing the cost of health services across workers rather than to study its’ interaction with a
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fore, in the numerical experiment I choose to fix the cost of health services for the
employed at the benchmark level and vary the cost of health services for the unem-
ployed. It is assumed that lower cost for the unemployed are made possible due to
subsidies financed through the equal lump-sum taxes on all workers.
2.5.1 Calibration
This section describes the choice of parameter values for the benchmark economy.
The values are chosen to match selected observations on the U.S. economy including
unemployment and different costs of health services faced by the workers in different
employment statuses in line with previous findings.
Besides the choice of model period, the following parameters are to be determined
in the calibration: discount factor β; the extent of the decreasing return to scale
γ; cost of health services for the employed and unemployed, He and Hu; transition
function of island’s productivity Q(z′|z) and the unemployment insurance benefits b.
I choose model period to be a quarter. This implies that job reallocations will
involve at least one quarter of unemployment. Though it is possible that average
duration of unemployment in the model economy will be substantially higher, this
choice is intended to capture a relatively short duration of unemployment in the
U.S. In the data, unemployment duration between 1983 to 2008, a period of a stable
variation in the duration of unemployment, averaged to 16.1 weeks 17 or 1.34 model
periods.
particular taxation scheme, it is reasonable to consider a subsidy financed through non-distortionary
taxes.
17The data is retrieved from FRED, iterative data tool provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LNU03008275#0.
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I set two parameters following standard practice without solving the model. The
discount factor is set to be β = 0.9898 which corresponds to the annual interest rate
of 4%. Parameter of the decreasing return to scale γ is set to be equal to 0.85 18 .
The remaining parameters are calibrated jointly. This means that the model is
solved for different sets of parameters. The set for which the model predictions match
empirical targets from the data discussed below is selected.
Turning to the cost of health services, He and Hu, recall that Section 2.2 finds
that the discounted rates for the privately insured are about 50% of that for the
uninsured. For the calibration, I assume that the cost of health services for the
employed workers who have access to ESHI are exactly 50% of the cost faced by the
unemployed, He = 0.5Hu, an average between discounts found in Section 2.2. The
level of He is chosen such that the ratio of the total health expenditures to GDP
in the model economy matches the share of health consumption expenditures 19 to
GDP in the data. The national health expenditures are constantly growing in the
U.S. Therefore, rather than matching data on health expenditures for a particular
year, I target the average share of health consumption expenditures in GDP for a
period from 2001 to 2013 equal to 15.2% 20 .
The transition matrix Q is taken to approximate the following AR(1) process:
ln(zt) = ρ ln(zt−1) + t,
18This choice is in line with papers, for example, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Brugemann and
Manovskii (2009), which use the same extent of the decreasing return to scale in the establishment
level production function.
19Matching the share of health consumption expenditures rather than national health expendi-
tures leaves aside the investment component of the latter. It is arguable if investments are financed
through the payments of individuals. Thus, I choose to not take into account this part of health
expenditures. To shed light on the size of the investment component, it should be noted that
investments account for about 6% of total health expenditures or 1% of GDP.
20Data on health care expenditures come from National Health Expenditure Accounts (2012).
GDP annual series are retrieved from Bureau of Economic Analysis interactive data tool, https:
//www.bea.gov/index.htm.
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where
t ∼ N(0, σ2 ), a ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ρ < 1.
Discrete approximation of this Markov process is made using Tauchen’s method
(Tauchen (1986)) on a grid of evenly-spaced 20 grid points over the interval
[−3.5√σ2/(1− ρ2), 3.5√σ2/(1− ρ2)], where √σ2/(1− ρ2) is a standard deviation
of the process of ln(zt).
The persistence of the process for the productivity shocks ρ is selected to match the
average unemployment rate of 6.3% for the period 2000-2012 21 . Choosing variance σ2
of log productivity process, I seek to capture the extent of frictional wage dispersion
in the data. One of the commonly used summary statistics of wage dispersion is
a mean-min ratio, which is the average wage divided by the lowest observed wage.
Hornstein et al. (2007) use various methodologies and data sets to measure mean-
min ratios in the data and arrive to the range of estimates between 1.5 and 2. An
appealing value chosen by these authors for their analysis is 1.7, which I also target
here with the choice of σ2.
Finally, I parameterize unemployment benefits b to match the average replacement
ratio in the data for the period 2001-2012 which is equal to 40.9%. Note that this index
measures the average benefits amount relative to the average wage rather than average
individual replacement ratio equal to 46.7% for the same time period. Therefore, the
model counterpart of the replacement ratio is the ratio of the unemployment benefits
b to the average wage.
Table 2.1 summarizes calibrated parameters, their definitions, targeted moment
in the data and the implied parameter values:
21Data sources: unemployment series https://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet.
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Parameter Target Value
Discount factor, β Interest rate 0.9898
Extent of the decreasing return to scale, γ Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) 0.85
Cost of health services for the employed, He Health consumption 0.1513
expenditures relative to GDP
Cost of health services for the unemployed, Hu Calculated from He = 0.5Hu 0.3025
AR(1) coefficient of the process of ln(zt), ρ Unemployment rate 0.7736
Variance of the process of ln(zt), σ
2
 Mean-min wage ratio 0.0257
Unemployment benefits, b Average replacement ratio 0.3688
Table 2.1: Model Parameters and Targets
Table 2.2 summarizes the targeted moments in the data and displays their coun-
terparts in the calibrated model:
Target Data Model
Health consumption expenditures relative to GDP 0.152 0.152
Unemployment rate 0.063 0.062
Mean-min wage ratio 1.7 1.7
Average replacement ratio 0.409 0.409
Table 2.2: Calibration Targets, Data vs. Model Predictions
The model matches the selected targets well. Notably, it replicates the dispersion
of wages as measured by the mean-min ratio when the latter is directly targeted. It
is known to be a hard task for a wide spectrum of models of equilibrium unemploy-
ment to generate an amount of frictional wage dispersion observed in the data. For
example, Hornstein et al. (2007) point out that standard search and matching mod-
els generate about 20-fold lower mean-min ratio, when the latter is not targeted. In
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this regards, calibration procedure can claim only a partial success because mean-min
ration was directly targeted while other unmatched moments deviate from the data.
For example, the calibrated model predicts that duration of unemployment is 1.0124
model periods while the data suggests it is 1.34 (exceeds model counterpart by about
4 weeks). To match observations on duration of unemployment, the model would
need to be augmented, perhaps, deviating from the fully directed search. However,
whether the augmented model could jointly match the duration of unemployment and
variation in wages is an open question.
2.5.2 Numerical Experiment
This section evaluates effects of the regulation eliminating differences in the cost
of health services across workers on unemployment rate, aggregate labor productivity
and aggregate output. In model terms, the numerical experiment refers to setting
Hu = He enacted in the above model for the calibrated values of parameters. The
results come from contrasting the performance of the benchmark economy featuring
He = 0.5Hu, as calibrated in the previous section, and the new stationary equilibrium
with Hu = He. Table 2.3 shows the results. Along with the main aggregates of
interest, the table also reports measures of wage dispersion (variance and mean-min
ratio), subsidy-to-output ratio under the policy regime Hu = He, health expenditures,
aggregate output net of health expenditures and duration of unemployment. All
values except unemployment, subsidy-to-output ratio and duration of unemployment
are normalized by their corresponding benchmark values.
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Variable Benchmark Hu = He
Unemployment rate 0.062 0.0765
Aggregate output 1 0.9974
Labor productivity 1 1.0118
Variance in wages 1 0.9120
Mean-min wage ratio 1 0.9703
Health expenditures 1 0.9442
subsidy-to-output ratio 0.0109
Aggregate output net of health expenditures 1 1.0062
Duration of unemployment 1.0124 1.0246
Table 2.3: Long-Run Effects of Eliminating Differences in the Cost of Health Services
Table 2.3 shows that equalizing cost of health services across workers leads to a
decrease in aggregate output by 0.26%. The lower output comes from the interac-
tion of two effects operating in opposite directions. One the other hand, the policy
increases unemployment rate from 6.2% to 7.45% which adversely affects aggregate
production. On the one hand, it improves labor productivity measured as output
per employed worker by 1.18% which increases aggregate output. However, a higher
productivity created by the policy cannot compensate a decrease in the output due
to lower employment, and aggregate output goes down.
Increase in unemployment rate caused by the policy is straightforward to under-
stand. A decrease in the cost of health services for the unemployed when Hu is set
at He level makes transition between jobs less painful which incentivizes people to
switch jobs and, thus, increases unemployment. In line with this reasoning, unem-
ployment goes up from 6.2% to 7.65%. Additionally, as cost of health services for the
unemployed decreases, the average unemployment duration increases from 1.0124 to
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1.0246. This response agrees with the fact that, upon arrival on the island and observ-
ing a new productivity, the workers tend to accept a job less easily since the option
of moving to another island is more attractive when the cost of being unemployed are
lower.
Increase in labor productivity bears a lot upon how the workers are allocated
across islands. To better understand the effect of the policy on the allocation of
workers across islands, below I discuss effects on worker’s allocation and productivity
pertaining to the search friction. Next, I turn to explain how the policy equalizing
the cost of health services changes the allocation of workers and leads to the increase
in labor productivity.
In this environment, mobility of workers between islands is associated with worker
flows moving from the islands suffering low productivity shocks to the islands expe-
riencing high productivity shocks. As some workers leave the islands with low pro-
ductivity, marginal products of labor adjust and wages for the workers remaining on
the island increase. As a results of this adjustment, some workers optimally decide
to stay on the island they would otherwise leave if wages were fixed since wages be-
come high enough to overweight benefits of transitioning to another island. In the
equilibrium scenario of a frictionless economy, such model mechanics would lead to
an economy-wide wage rate consistent with economy-wide labor market clearing con-
dition. In the world with a search friction, loosing labor income and going through
the costly unemployment prevents some departures from the islands experiencing low
productivity and decreases arrivals to the islands experiencing high productivity. As
a result, low productivity islands hire more worker and high productivity ones hire
less workers compared to the frictionless world, and variation in marginal products
of labor across islands arises. Obviously, emerging dispersion in marginal products of
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labor lowers labor productivity as compared with the first-best allocation where the
same workers are allocated across islands so that the marginal products are equalized.
This discussion suggests that any policy increasing the cost of being unemployed
amplifies the adverse effect of the search friction on the allocation of workers across
islands and lowers labor productivity. Higher cost of being unemployed prevents
more worker from moving to another island, and leads to more workers allocated
to low productivity islands and less workers allocated to high productivity islands.
Consequently, dispersion in marginal products of labor/wages across islands increases
signaling about worse allocation of workers across islands and lower productivity.
Conversely, a policy lowering the cost of being unemployed, as the one considered
in this paper, drives a higher willingness of workers to reallocate to new jobs after their
island is hit by the low productivity shock. In other words, it mitigates the sources
driving worker’s unwillingness to move from the low productivity shock islands to
high productivity ones. As a result, the pattern of worker’s allocation across islands
is altered: less worker are willing to stay on the low productivity islands and more
workers settle on the high productivity ones. Say differently, the allocation of workers
across islands moves towards the allocation in the frictionless world. Figure 2.7 below
illustrates the distribution of employment across islands characterized by different
productivity levels in the benchmark economy, under the policy setting Hu = He and
in the first-best. As seen from the figure, the allocation of workers under the policy
Hu = He is shifted to the right compared with the benchmark, in the direction closer
to that in the frictionless economy.
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of Employment Across Islands with Different Productivity
Levels
As more workers leave low productivity islands and stay on the high productivity
ones, the dispersion in the marginal products of labor across islands decreases which
signals about a better allocation of workers across islands which leads to an increase
in labor productivity. These effects can be seen in Table 2.3 demonstrating that,
with the introduction of the policy, variance in wages (marginal costs of labor) and
mean-min ration decrease by correspondingly 8.8% and 2.97% and labor productivity
increases by 1.18%.
To summarize the effects of the policy, the numerical results show that, when the
cost of health services are equalized across workers, losses due to higher rotation of
the workers between jobs (higher unemployment) induced by a lower cost of unem-
ployment overtake gains in labor productivity due to a better allocation of workers
across jobs (less workers on low productivity islands and more workers on the high
productivity ones). As a result, aggregate output decreases by 0.26%.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
The link between access to HI and employment is an essential attribute of the U.S.
health care system which is often viewed as a serious distortion influencing aggregate
economic outcomes. In this paper, I studied effects of one distortion induced by this
link - correlation between employment status of the worker and the cost of health
services. On the one hand, the cost of health services are higher if the patient does not
have HI. On the other hand, majority of workers receive HI through the employment
and lose access to it if they leave the employer. As a result, the unemployed face higher
cost of health services which affects worker’s incentive to reallocate between jobs and
impacts the performance of the economy. The focus of this paper is on a quantitative
exploration of the effects of higher cost of health services for the unemployed on
unemployment, aggregate labor productivity and aggregate output.
On methodological ground, I build the analysis upon classical theoretical frame-
work of Lucas and Prescott (1974) extended to include cost of health services for
the workers which are correlated with worker’s employment status. Numerical ex-
periment of equalizing these costs across workers in the calibrated model shows that
the aggregate output decreases by 0.26%. Nevertheless, output decrease is hard to
conjecture a priori as there operates an important trade-off. First, lowering the cost
of health services for the unemployed enables workers to search more which increases
unemployment and decreases aggregate output. Second, it permits workers to pursue
search and undertake more productive jobs which improves the allocation of resources
and raises aggregate output. In the model environment of this paper, improvement
in allocative efficiency is reflected in higher labor productivity and is a result of a
better allocation of workers across existing jobs rather than due to new and more
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productive jobs being created 22 . In turn, the allocation of labor existing jobs im-
proves due to less workers being hired by low productivity islands and more workers
being hired by high productivity ones which decreases variance in the marginal cost
of labor across islands. As a result, the increased unemployment is accompanied by a
counterbalancing force of improved labor productivity which, however, in the quan-
titative experiment of this paper cannot overweight reduction in output induced by
higher unemployment.
22A possibility that unemployment insurance may raise aggregate output by inducing creation
of riskier but more productive jobs is discussed in Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) and Acemoglu and
Shimer (2000).
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL BENCHMARK STATISTICS FOR CHAPTER 1
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Age Category
≤ 1 2 3 to 5 ≥ 6
years years years years
Average size, data 1 7.94 10.70 12.61 22.16
Average size, model 7.94 9.86 11.39 21.03
Fraction of establishments sponsoring HI, data 2 0.2233 0.2873 0.3131 0.5411
Fraction of establishments sponsoring HI, model 0.2233 0.2677 0.3178 0.6495
Table A.1: Average Size of Establishment and HI Provision, by Establishment Age
1Source: calculated from Business Employment Dynamics (BED) data, year 2000.
2Source: calculated using the Survey data, Long and Marquis (1997).
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APPENDIX B
CHARACTERIZATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE
TWO-PERIOD MODEL
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To find the solution of the model, I solve the system of Bellman equations for
the workers having decided to stay on the island (2.2) and the unemployed (2.3)
stated in Section 2.3.2. Then, I obtain a stationary distribution of islands across
individual states, λ(x, z). Finally, I characterize the equilibrium in the economy
evoking economy-wide labor market clearing condition.
Expressions (2.2) and (2.3) state that:
V (x1, z1) = z1f(x1)−He + β [p1V (x1, z1) + (1− p1)V (x1, z2)] ,
V (x2, z1) = z1f(x1)−He + β [p1V (x1, z1) + (1− p1)V (x1, z2)] ,
V (x1, z2) = z2f(x1)−He + β [p2V (x2, z2) + (1− p2)V (x2, z1)] ,
V (x2, z2) = z2f(x2)−He + β [p2V (x2, z2) + (1− p2)V (x2, z1)]
and
V (x2, z1) = −Hu + β [p2V (x2, z2) + (1− p2)V (x2, z1)] .
First two equations are the same which reduces the system to
V (x2, z1) = z1f(x1)−He + β [p1V (x1, z1) + (1− p1)V (x1, z2)] , (B.1)
V (x1, z2) = z2f(x1)−He + β [p2V (x2, z2) + (1− p2)V (x2, z1)] , (B.2)
V (x2, z2) = z2f(x2)−He + β [p2V (x2, z2) + (1− p2)V (x2, z1)] , (B.3)
V (x2, z1) = −Hu + β [p2V (x2, z2) + (1− p2)V (x2, z1)] . (B.4)
From (B.3),
V (x2, z2) =
1
1− βp2 (z2f(x2)−He + β(1− p2)V (x2, z1)) .
Combining the above expression with (B.4) yields:
V (x2, z1) =
1
1− β [−(1− βp2)Hu − βp2He + βp2z2f(x2)] . (B.5)
Now, combine (B.2) and (B.4) to get
V (x1, z2) = z2f(x1)−He +Hu + V (x2, z1)
and substitute it in (B.1):
V (x2, z1) =
1
1− β [β(1− p1)Hu − (1− β(1− p1))He + f(x1)(z1 + β(1− p1)z2)] .
(B.6)
Equating (B.5) and (B.6) yields an equilibrium relationship between employment
levels x1 and x2 as given in equation (2.3.2) in Section 2.3.2:
f(x1)(z1 + β(1− p1)z2)− βp2z2f(x2) + (Hu −He)(1 + β − β(p1 + p2)) = 0. (B.7)
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Now, I proceed to derive a stationary distribution of islands across individual
states, λ(x, z).
First, it should be noted that the equilibrium is characterized by the steady state
distribution of islands across productivities z1 and z2. The mass of islands experi-
encing productivity shock zi is denoted λ(zi), i ∈ {1, 2}, and found by solving the
following system of equations:
[ λ(z1) λ(z2) ]
[
p1 1− p1
1− p2 p2
]
= [ λ(z1) λ(z2) ] .
The solution to the system yields:
λ1 =
1− p2
2− p1 − p2 , λ2 =
1− p1
2− p1 − p2 .
Recall, that islands in the state (x1, z2) are the islands that have just experienced
a positive productivity shock which happens with probability 1− p1. Therefore, the
mass of islands in the state (x1, z2) is:
λ(x1, z2) =
(1− p1)(1− p2)
2− p1 − p2
which also implies that
λ(x1, z1) =
p1(1− p2)
2− p1 − p2 .
Analogously, the mass of islands λ(x2, z1) and λ(x2, z2) are given by:
λ(x2, z1) =
(1− p1)(1− p2)
2− p1 − p2 , λ(x2, z2) =
p2(1− p1)
2− p1 − p2 .
The labor market clearing condition declares that the number of workers located
on the islands at the end of the period have to be equal to the total number of workers
in the economy. There is no movement of workers on the islands (x1, z1) and (x2, z2).
Therefore, they have correspondingly x1 and x2 at the end of the period equal to
what they have started with. The workers are reallocated from the islands (x2, z1)
implying that the islands started the period with x2 workers have x1 at the end of
the period. Finally, the moving workers allocate on the island (x1, z2) at the end of
the period. Therefore, these islands have x2 workers at the end of the period. Thus,
the labor market clearing condition is:
[λ(x1, z1) + λ(x2, z1)]x1 + [λ(x1, z2) + λ(x2, z2)]x2 = 1,
or
λ(z1)x1 + λ(z2)x2 = 1. (B.8)
Solving the system of equations (B.7) and (B.8) yields equilibrium employment
levels of x1 and x2.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 IN CHAPTER 2
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The problem of maximizing aggregate output in Section 2.3.2 is written as:
Max
x1,x2
λ(x1, z1)F (x1, z1) + λ(x1, z2)F (x1, z2) + λ(x2, z1)F (x1, z1) + λ(x2, z2)F (x2, z2)
s.t. [λ(x1, z1) + λ(x2, z1)]x1 + [λ(x1, z2) + λ(x2, z2)]x2 = 1.
As the distribution of islands across individual states in the steady state of the
competitive equilibrium does not depend on the employment levels x1 and x2, λ(x, z)
is this problem is characterized by the expressions derived in Appendix B. Then, the
feasibility constraint can be written as (B.8) from Appendix B which also implies
that ∂x2
∂x1
= −λ(z1)
λ(z2)
.
Then, the F.O.C. to the above problem of maximizing aggregate output becomes:
(z1λ(x1, z1) + z2λ(x1, z2) + z1λ(x2, z1)) f(x1)− λ(z1)
λ(z2)
λ(x2, z2)f(x2) = 0.
Substituting expressions for λ(x, z) and λ(z) derived in Appendix B gives an
output-maximizing level of x1 as a solution to:
f(x1)(z1 + (1− p1)z2)− p2z2f(x2) = 0. (C.1)
where x2 is obtained from (B.8) in Appendix B.
Recall, that the relationship between equilibrium levels of x1 and x2 is given by:
f(x1)(z1 + β(1− p1)z2)− βp2z2f(x2) + (Hu −He)(1 + β − β(p1 + p2)) = 0. (C.2)
Comparing (C.1) and (C.2), one can conclude that, if the discount factor is close
to 1, then (C.2) implies (C.1) is Hu = He. Say differently, if β → 1, then competitive
equilibrium allocation maximizes aggregate output when Hu → He.
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PARAMETERIZATION OF THE TWO-PERIOD MODEL
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This section describes the choice of parameter values for the two-period model
used for graphical analysis in Section 2.3.
Majority of the parameters are chosen to match observations for the U.S. economy
serving as a basis for calibration of the full model in Section 2.5.1. More specifically,
I choose model period to be a quarter and set the discount factor to be β = 0.9898.
Parameter of the decreasing return to scale γ is taken to be equal 0.85. It is as-
sumed that Hu = 0.5He and He is chosen to match the ratio of health consumption
expenditures to GDP.
The transition matrix Q is constructed in the following way. The value of p1 =
Prob(z1|z1) is chosen so that the unemployment in the model is equal to the average
unemployment rate of 6.3% in the data. The value of p2 = Prob(z2|z2) is chosen to
mimic the average duration of unemployment of 16.1 weeks (1.34 model periods).
Finally, the model is constructed for two productivity levels, z1 and z2. In the
full model, the grid for z is approximated on the interval ±3.5 · standard deviation
around the mean of the process for ln(z). So, once the parameters of the process are
picked, the grid for the productivity is known and there is no need to match levels of
z to any target. In the two-period model, z1 and z2 are free parameters which have to
be disciplined to match some targets. In this regards, I normalize the value of z1 to
be 1. The value of z2 is selected to match wage mean-min ratio of 1.7 (this target is
used in Section 2.5.1 to calibrate variance of the process for ln(z) in the full model).
Table D.1 summarizes chosen parameter values:
Parameter Value
Discount factor, β 0.9898
Extent of the decreasing return to scale, γ 0.85
Cost of medical services for the employed, He 0.2440
Cost of medical services for the unemployed, Hu 0.4880
Prob(z1|z1), p1 0.7875
Prob(z2|z2), p2 0.7475
Table D.1: Parameter Values in the Two-Period Model
It should be noted, that all targeted values are matched precisely in the two-period
model.
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In this Appendix, I provide a comparative statics results for some equilibrium
objects to support the discussion in Section 2.3.2. First, I show that, unemployment
decreases in Hu. Second, I verify that the allocation of labor deteriorates and moves
away from the fist-best allocation. This part is accomplished by demonstrating that
the gap in the marginal products of labor increases in Hu compared to no gap in the
first-best. Finally, I show that when β → 1 and Hu > He, aggregate output decreases
in Hu. The latter also establishes that an increase in employment is not enough to
offset decrease in labor productivity as Hu increases and, hence, aggregate output
decreases.
I start demonstrating that unemployment level decreases in Hu. The number of
people departing from each individual island (x2, z1) is equal to x2−x1. At the same
time, the mass of islands from which the departures happen is given by λ(x2, z1).
Then, the number of the unemployed in the economy is:
U = λ(x2, z1)(x2 − x1).
Thus,
∂U
∂Hu
= λ(x2, z1)
(
∂x2
∂Hu
− ∂x1
∂Hu
)
. (E.1)
Express x2 from the labor market clearing condition (B.8):
x2 = 1− λ(z1)
λ(z2)
x1,
which implies that:
∂x2
∂Hu
= − λ(z1)
λ(z2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂x1
∂Hu
.
Therefore, the sign of ∂x2
∂Hu
is just the opposite of the sign of ∂x1
∂Hu
.
To determine the sign on ∂x1
∂Hu
, substitute expression for x2 in (B.7) and denote
left-hand side of (B.7) as G(x1):
G(x1) = f(x1)(z1 + β(1− p1)z2)− βp2z2f(1− λ(z1)
λ(z2)
x1) + (Hu −He)(1 + β − β(p1 + p2)).
Then, according to Implicit Function Theorem,
∂x1
∂Hu
= −
(
∂G
∂x1
)−1
∂G
∂Hu
= − 1 + β − β(p1 + p2)
f ′(x1)(z1 + β(1− p1)z2) + βp2z2f ′(1− λ(z1)λ(z2)x1)
.
Because production function F (x, z) is a decreasing return to scale, it follows that
f ′(x) < 0 and, hence, implies that the denominator of this fraction is negative. Notice
that 1 + β − β(p1 + p2) ≥ 1 + β − 2β = 1− β > 0 which implies that the nominator
of the fraction is positive. Therefore,
∂x1
∂Hu
> 0 ⇒ ∂x2
∂Hu
< 0.
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In words, it implies that the employment on the islands (x1, z1), (x1, z2), (x2, z1)
increases while that on the island (x2, z2) decreases. It also follows from expression
(E.1) that ∂U
∂Hu
< 0, i.e. unemployment decreases in Hu.
Now, I demonstrate that an increase in Hu worsens the allocation of labor and
increases the gap in the marginal products of labor across the islands. First, notice
that the first-best allocation occurs at the point when the marginal products of labor
of the islands are equalized:
z1f(x
∗
1) = z2f(x
∗
2) or f(x
∗
1) =
z2
z1
f(x∗2),
where x∗1 and x
∗
2 denote the first-best employment on the islands experiencing pro-
ductivity shocks z1 and z2.
Express f(x1) from the equilibrium condition (B.7):
f(x1) =
βp2z2
z1 + β(1− p1)z2f(x2)− (Hu −He)
1 + β − β(p1 + p2)
z1 + β(1− p1)z2 .
If Hu = He, then the condition above implies that:
f(x1) =
βp2z2
z1 + (1− p1)z2f(x2) <
z2
z1 + (1− p1)z2f(x2) <
z2
z1
f(x2). (E.2)
Since labor market clearing condition (B.8) is satisfied in both first-best and equi-
librium allocations and f ′(x) is decreasing in x, the equilibrium employment levels
satisfy:
x1 > x
∗
1 and x2 < x
∗
2
which essentially gives a deviation of marginal products of labor from each other as
defined by E.2.
It was shown before that x1 increases and x2 decreases in Hu. Then, because
f ′(x) is decreasing in x, it translates into an increase in the gap between left-hand
and right-hand side of inequality (E.2), or an increase in the gap between marginal
products of labor across islands. As a result, the allocation of labor worsens compared
to the first-best.
Finally, I show that the output decreases in Hu when β is close to 1 and Hu > He.
The present value of the economy’s output Y is given by the objective function of
output maximization problem in Appendix C. Differentiating the objective function
with respect to Hu yields:
∂Y
∂Hu
= (z1λ(x1, z1) + z2λ(x1, z2) + z1λ(x2, z1)) f(x1)
∂x1
∂Hu
+ λ(x2, z2)f(x2)
∂x2
∂Hu
.
Using expressions for λ(x, z) and evoking labor market clearing condition to find
∂x2
∂Hu
, one can show that:
∂Y
∂Hu
= (f(x1)(z1 + (1− p1)z2)− p2z2f(x2)) ∂x1
∂Hu
.
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As argued before, ∂x1
∂Hu
> 0. At the same time, when β → 1, it follows from the
equilibrium condition (B.7) that
f(x1)(z1 + (1− p1)z2)− p2z2f(x2)→ −(Hu −He)(2− p1 − p2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 if Hu>He
.
Hence, ∂Y
∂Hu
< 0 when β → 1 and Hu > He, i.e. aggregate output decreases in Hu.
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